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ERIE SLAPP BACK 
Jack B. Harrison* 
Abstract: Dozens of states have enacted anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation (SLAPP) laws to counter SLAPP suits, or lawsuits filed to silence a defendant 
who has spoken out against a plaintiff. The primary goal of a SLAPP suit is not to win on the 
merits, but rather to discourage the defendant from exercising their right to free speech by 
threatening excessively expensive litigation. State anti-SLAPP laws provide for special 
motions to dismiss, discovery limitations, and fee shifting, all designed to allow a defendant to 
expeditiously dispose of the SLAPP suit before engaging in costly discovery. 
This Article discusses the development of state anti-SLAPP laws and the evolution of the 
Erie doctrine through the Shady Grove decision, ultimately examining how lower courts have 
struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the context of state anti-SLAPP special motions to 
dismiss. This Article then discusses the various theoretical solutions that have been offered for 
this dilemma, concluding that the conflict between state anti-SLAPP laws and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is unavoidable and irreconcilable under the Rules Enabling Act and 
Erie and its progeny. Based on this analysis, this Article concludes that federal courts sitting 
in diversity cannot apply state anti-SLAPP laws. The only mechanism for accomplishing the 
specifically defined purpose of state anti-SLAPP laws in federal court is for the Congress to 
adopt a federal anti-SLAPP law that would supplement the operation of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
T  a  ha  T m  U i e i  ha ed P e ide  T m  mag e ic 
capacity for unwanted attention during its brief, sordid lifetime would be 
an understatement. Certainly, the New York State Education Department 
seemed drawn to it in 2005 to warn the company that it could not legally 
call itself a university.1 And then came the allegations of deception, unfair 
                                                     




Harrison_Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:51 PM 
2020] ERIE SLAPP BACK 1255 
 
business practices, and fraud.2 B  hile he ga i a i  h  life a  
riddled with fraud and deceit might seem little more to the casual onlooker 
than caveat emptor, it offers a unique perspective into the newest issue 
plaguing federal litigators attempting to apply anti-SLAPP statutes in 
federal court. This issue requires context, and the case of Trump 
University deserves an autopsy. 
Trump University was founded in 2004 by the eponymous Donald 
Trump and its president, Michael Sexton, as a program that offers real 
estate and investing coaching.3 I  mi i  a   ai , ed ca e a d 
mentor entrepreneurs on achieving financial independence through real 
e a e i e i g. 4 Advertising prominently featured Trump, who 
collaborated with the organization on several books.5 In particular, the 
organization, through Sexton, promised that it would not be like other 
ga i a i  ha  try to sell help alone, without the proven expertise to 
back it up, and just when you begin to realize that the advice you paid for 
is unproven and ineffective they try to sell you more expensive 
d c . The  h k   mi e  a d e e  deli e . 6 
Immediately, the organization drew public attention and criticism from 
c mme a  h  lamba ed T m  U i e i  b i e  ac ice .7 
Calli g T m  U i e i  a cam[],  c i ic  lled  che  i  
claiming that the organization sold overpriced workshops to ignorant 
customers.8 Some of these critics pointed to steep fees as proof of Trump 
U i e i  di h e  m i a i . A d he  f d i  ici  ha  
Trump University targeted students who struggled from the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis.9 This was not enough to deter Tarla Makaeff, who first 
paid the $1,495 fee for a three-day seminar in August 2008, followed by 
                                                     
2. See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 260 (9th Cir. 2013); People v. Trump 
Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 26 N.Y.S.3d 66, 69 (2016). 
3. See Trump, 26 N.Y.S.3d at 67.  
4. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 258. 
5. Id. at 259 (citing FED. R. EVID. 201; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 
960 (9 h Ci . 2010)) ( aki g j dicial ice f T m  c llab a i  i h he U i e i   b k  
and articles). 
6. Id. (citing Michael Sexton, Foreword to TRUMP UNIVERSITY WEALTH BUILDING 101: YOUR 
FIRST 90 DAYS ON THE PATH TO PROSPERITY, at ix (Donald J. Trump ed., 2007)).  
7. Id. (citing David Lazarus, Trump Spins in Foreclosure Game, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 16, 2014), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus12dec12-column.html [https://perma.cc/NY5V-
NG6G]) ( [Q] e i [i g] T m  U i e i  b i e  ac ice  i  he la ge  c e  f he b ime 
m gage c i i . ). 
8. Id. (citing complaints about Trump University on Internet message boards). 
9. Lazarus, supra note 7. 
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a $34,995 a me  f  he T m  G ld Eli e P g am. 10 
What does he T m  G ld Eli e P g am  c i  f? Allegedl , hi  
program gave valuable insight for subscribers to go to Trulia.com to find 
real estate properties and the IRS website to learn about taxes.11 The real 
estate sales techniques taught at seminars were nothing spectacular b  
l , a d ell high  a d imila  ad ice fea ed a hefty price tag.12 
Moreover, customers alleged that the videos included with the program 
were five-years-old, contained information that customers could find for 
free over the Internet, and provided students with allegedly ineffectual 
mentors who were notoriously unresponsive.13 
Critics thought this caliber of product was unbecoming of the Trump 
brand.14 And meanwhile, Makaeff became worried about her increasingly 
bleak financial condition after paying for various programs.15 Upon 
contacting a Trump University representative, she found out she was 
ineligible for a refund.16 After spending a year with the program and 
a em i g  ec cile he  g ie a ce  i h i  h gh he U i e i  
f ee me i g  e ice , Makaeff  stance shifted dramatically.17 
She wrote letters to the Better Business Bureau accusing Trump and 
the University of a series of fraudulent and deceptive business practices.18 
Inevitably, this led to a large class action suit brought against Trump 
                                                     
10. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 260.  
11. See Jim Zarroli, T  U e  C e : G d E e  P g a  N h g B  F  G d, 
NAT L PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/06/480948631/trump-university-
customer-gold-elite-program-nothing-but-fools-gold [https://perma.cc/WXG5-A89V]; see also Ian 
Tuttle, Yes, Trump University Was a Massive Scam, NAT L REV. (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/trump-university-scam/ [https://perma.cc/6JK8-8A4M]. 
12. Lazarus, supra note 7. 
13. See Terry Spencer, Ex-T  U e  S de  Wa  he P e de  A g , ASSOCIATED 
PRESS NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/c5ce93f7f21d4c589a0b71293fa75b49 
[https://perma.cc/MWT2-VNMM].  
14. Lazarus, supra note 7. 
15. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 260. 
16. Id. 
17. Id.  
18. Id. The court describes these letters in the following manner:  
I  b h le e , Makaeff a e ed ha  T m  U i e i  e gaged i  f a d le  b i e  
ac ice ,  dece i e b i e  ac ice ,  illegal eda  high e e cl i g ac ic ,  
e al fi a cial i f ma i  f a d,  illegal bai  a d i ch,  b ai a hi g cheme[ ],  
igh  f a d,  g a d la ce ,  ide i  hef ,  lici ed aki g f e al c edi  a d 
icke  i  [ ic] e i g c edi  ca d ,  f a d le  b i e  ac ice  ili ed f  illegal 
ma e ial gai ,  fel i  eachi g ,  e linguistic programming and high pressure sales 
ac ic  ba ed  he ch l g  f ca ci ,  e hical ac ic ,  a ga ga a  am  f 
mi leadi g, f a d le , a d eda  beha i ,  a d b i e  ac ice  ha  a e c imi al.   
Id.  
 
Harrison_Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:51 PM 
2020] ERIE SLAPP BACK 1257 
 
University for its allegedly deceptive practices.19 But Trump University 
b gh  a c e claim, allegi g defama i  ba ed  Makaeff  le e  
to the Better Business Bureau and other Internet posts.20 Makaeff 
e ded i h a m i   ike de  Calif ia  a i-SLAPP statute, 
which would have not only removed the claim, but required Trump to pay 
Makaeff  a e  fee  if he l .21 This raised an interminable civil 
procedural question, from which the Ninth Circuit found no escape
under the Erie doctrine, does a state anti-SLAPP statute apply in 
federal court? 
This question is the focus of this Article. Why does this matter and how 
might the answer to that question impact litigation? Under the Erie 
doctrine a federal court sitting in diversity is to apply state substantive law 
to the state law claim in front of it and apply federal procedural law. Yet, 
state anti-SLAPP statutes allow a defendant  file a ecial m i   
ike   di mi  a  action before trial. This process appears to be 
fundamentally procedural and to answer the same procedural question 
regarding the sufficiency of a claim as Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The critical difference between the two is that 
state anti-SLAPP statutes impose a burden on both parties that is greater 
than that imposed by the federal rules. 
In Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC,22 for example, if the California 
anti-SLAPP statute is applied, the moving defendant (in this case, 
Makaeff as counterclaim defendant) must first make a prima facie 
h i g ha  he lai iff  (i  hi  ca e, T m  a  he c e claim 
plaintiff) suit arises from an ac  i  f he a ce f he defe da  
constitutional right to free speech.23 Once the moving defendant meets this 
b de , he  he b de  hif   he m i g lai iff  e abli h a 
reasonable probability that it will prevail on its claim in order for that 
claim to survive dismissal. 24 In contrast, under Rules 12 or 56, to survive 
dismissal, the nonmoving party is only required to show that an issue of 
material fact exists that raises a jury question.25 The end result under these 
two procedural mechanisms could be very different, which highlights the 
Erie problem in this matter. 
This Article will describe the importance of preserving crucial First 
                                                     
19. Id.  
20. Id.  
21. Id. at 260, 274.  
22. 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013). 
23. Id. at 261. 
24. Id. 
25. See Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 245 46 (5th Cir. 2019).  
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Amendment values and analyze the legal uncertainty surrounding the 
applicability of anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court under the Erie 
doctrine in light of the currently existing circuit split. As most first-year 
civil procedure students learn, the Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins26 and the cases that follow it, established that a federal court 
sitting in diversity is to apply state substantive law and federal procedural 
rules.27 H e e , f ll i g he S eme C  deci i  i  Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,28 it is unclear whether 
state statutes that create anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss should 
apply in federal courts sitting in diversity. 
Part I introduces the conflict between preserving First Amendment 
rights under anti-SLAPP statutes and the Erie doctrine and describes the 
difficulty courts have had in providing a clear analytical path. Part II 
discusses what anti-SLAPP statutes are, how they work, and why they are 
beneficial to citizens seeking to exercise their First Amendment rights of 
expression. Part III discusses the history and development of the Erie 
doctrine, leading to the current uncertainty about the application of anti-
SLAPP statutes in federal court. Part IV provides a review of the current 
circuit split on whether state anti-SLAPP statutes can apply in federal 
courts. Part V argues that, based on Supreme Court precedent, anti-
SLAPP statutes should not apply in a federal court sitting in diversity as 
a procedural matter and offers some possible solutions to this dilemma, 
including the adoption of federal legislation. 
I. THE RISE OF THE SLAPP AND THE ANTI-SLAPP 
The history of anti-SLAPP statutes is notable for the rapidity with 
which they emerged as a prominent feature of state practice. The term 
SLAPP  ca  be aced back  a  a icle i e  b  P fe  Pe el e 
Canan and George Pring.29 Canan and Pring conducted studies to chart 
the phenomenon of parties filing suits in o de   mie i di id al  
petitioning activities and noted that courts were starting to acknowledge 
SLAPP i  e ale ce.30 Through their studies, they found that such 
                                                     
26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
27. Id. at 79 80. 
28. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
29. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
(SLAPPs): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 962 
(1992). 
30. Id. a  943 ( The c   cie  i  e m  f he h ea    libe  a d f eed m i  be d 
calculation . . . . To prohibit robust debate on these questions would deprive society of the benefit of 
its collective thinking and . . . destroy the free exchange of ideas which is the adhesive of our 
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suits were becoming commonplace in 1992, the date of the article, as 
mechanisms to dissuade political involvement.31 Professors Canan and 
P i g ided he f ll i g defi i i  f a SLAPP claim: 1. [a] ci il 
complaint or counterclaim, 2. filed against nongovernment individuals or 
organizations, 3. because of their communications to government 
(government bodies, officials, or the electorate), 4. on a substantive issue 
f me blic i e e   c ce . 32 The subject matter of these claims 
generally focused on defamation, business torts, and constitutional issues, 
while hovering around such public issues as civil rights, environmental 
protection, and criticism of public officials.33 Furthermore, such suits 
often contain unreasonably high damage claims.34 
Professors Canan and Pring sought to enable attorneys and politically 
ac i e ci i e   ide if  he a i g ig al  f a SLAPP, i  de   
take the necessary measures to halt the progress of a SLAPP suit in its 
tracks.35 While acknowledging that both the motion to dismiss and 
summary judgment are the foremost mechanisms to banish a SLAPP suit, 
Canan and Pring hoped to have more legislatures adopt some version of 
an anti-SLAPP statute.36 
                                                     
dem c ac .  ( i g Webb . F , 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981), overruled by Harris v. Adkins, 
432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993))). 
31. Id. at 944 ( i g ha , de i e ha  he a  maj i  l ima el  a e di mi ed,  he e e ial 
e f blic a ici a i  i  g e me  i  f a ed (ci i g Whi e  . Calif ia, 274 U.S. 
357, 375 76 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969))).  
32. Id. at 946 47 (citing Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & SOC Y REV. 385, 
387 (1988)). 
33. Id. at 947; see also Andrew L. Roth, Note, Upping the Ante: Rethinking Anti-SLAPP Laws in 
the Age of the Internet, 2016 BYU L. REV. 741, 741 (2016) (noticing courts are now applying anti-
SLAPP laws in Internet defamation cases).  
34. See Katelyn E. Saner, Note, Getting Slapp-ed in Federal Court: Applying State Anti-SLAPP 
Special Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 63 DUKE L.J. 781, 788 (2013) (citing 
Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the 
Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 404 (1993); James E. Grossberg & Dee Lord, Ca f a  A -
SLAPP Statute, 13 COMMC NS L. 3, 4 (1995)). 
35. Pring & Canan, supra note 29, a  950 ( i g ha  he a ge  f a SLAPP i  h ld ake 
e   cha ac e i e he i  i  a a  ha  i  a  li icall  cha ged a  ible  i k[e] he 
protection of the Petition Clause [and to remind] the court that there is another, better forum in which 
he di e ca  be e l ed ). 
36. Id. a  959 ( a i g ha , If blic a ici a i  i  g e me  . . . is to be encouraged, it will 
take adoption of legislation that (1) protects the full range of public advocacy, (2) before all branches 
and levels of government, (3) discourages the filing of SLAPPs, and (4) provides effective summary 
adj dica i  f  h e ha  a e filed ). 
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A. Anti-SLAPP Foundations in the Petition Clause 
With their groundbreaking article, Canan and Pring encouraged states 
to pass anti-SLAPP statutes or at least extend relevant precedent. The 
Colorado Supreme Court in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. 
District Court (POME)37 took the latter route, extending an antitrust 
doctrine based in the Petition Clause to hold that a SLAPP statute violated 
the First Amendment.38 Later, numerous states enacted anti-SLAPP 
statutes, drawing on similar principles.39 
Some scholars have suggested that upholding activity protected under 
the Petition Clause was a concept that had previously been emphasized 
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.40 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
arose out of two Supreme Court cases that held that antitrust laws are not 
applicable when competitors assemble to petition legislators.41 Courts 
ec g i e a ham  e ce i   he d c i e.42 The doctrine would not 
protect competitors from antitrust liability where they brought multiple 
suits against a competitor under the guise of petitioning, but, in actuality, 
e ed a  a  a em   i e fe e di ec l  i h he b i e  ela i hi  
f a c m e i . 43 While the doctrine applies only to antitrust legislation, 
he d c i e  al a  defe e f f eed m  a emble a allel  he  
step process utilized in the current anti-SLAPP decisions in dismissing a 
claim.44 Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may have provided 
some inspiration, the factors commonly utilized in anti-SLAPP legislation 
                                                     
37. 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984). 
38. Id. at 1370; see also Pring & Canan, supra note 29, at 951. 
39. Pring & Canan, supra note 29, at 959 60 (noting that bills in New York, California, and 
Washington had already or were in the process of adopting promising anti-SLAPP statutes).  
40. Colin Quinlan, Note, Erie and the First Amendment: State Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Court 
After Shady Grove, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 367, 372 77 (2014); see also Carson Hilary Barylak, Note, 
Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 855 (2010). 
41. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 674 75 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents 
Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 145 (1961); see also BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN 
C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION § 10:21 (2017 2018 ed. 2017). 
42. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
43. Id.  
44. Selec  P f li  Se ici g . Vale i , 875 F. S . 2d 975, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ( The fi  
part of the anti-SLAPP inquiry is substantially the same as the inquiry into whether the Noerr-
Pennington d c i e a lie .  (ci i g Kearney v. Foley and Lardner, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 n.3 
(S.D. Cal. 2008))); see also Me ab life I l, I c. . W ick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9 h Ci . 2001); 
L Bi d  . Sch a , 970 A.2d 1007, 1020 (N.J. 2009) ( [T]he maj i  f he [ a e a i-SLAPP] 
a e  fi d hei   i  he U i ed S a e  S eme C  Noerr-Pennington doctrine, creating 
imm i  ha  ec  ac i  ha  fall i hi  he a ame e  f he ed e  f e  g ie a ce   
the g e me . ).  
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were first set out in POME.45 
There, the Colorado State Supreme Court dealt with an environmental 
g  defe e agai  a m l imilli  d lla  la i  b  a de el e  
against the group for opposing land development.46 Noting a trend for 
courts to apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in recent cases, the court 
found that the right to petition was something that included unhindered 
access to the courts.47 For the Colorado Supreme Court, this view was 
reflected in countless decisions protecting First Amendment petitioning 
activity from liability.48 N i g ha  he ham e ce i  a lica i  i  
antitrust suits depends upon whether the claim is to harass, the Colorado 
Supreme Court extended the exception to protect legitimate petitioning 
ac i i  a ge ed b  a  li le a  a i gle la i  lacki g a  ea able 
basis in fact or law and brought primarily to harass or to improperly deter 
a he  legi ima e ac i i ie . 49 
The court sought to uphold petitioning activity and acknowledged that 
i  i h  me i  filed agai  ci i e  ca  ha e a ig ifica  chilli g 
effect on the exercise of their First Amendment right to petition the courts 
f  ed e  f g ie a ce . 50 Laying the ground for anti-SLAPP statutes 
soon to follow, the court found that when a defendant files a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that their claim is an illegitimate attempt to impede 
 he defe da  c i i al igh   e i i , he lai iff m  
show that their claim is not illegitimate.51 If the plaintiff failed to meet this 
b de , he c  ld he  ea  ch a m i   di mi  a  e f  
mma  j dgme ,   be j dged b  a ic e  a da d ha  a ical 
motion to dismiss.52 The court described the following burden shifting 
                                                     
45. P ec  O  M ai  E , I c. . Di . C ., 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984); see also Pring & 
Canan, supra note 29, at 951.  
46. P ec  O  M a  E , I c., 677 P.2d at 1362.  
47. Id. a  1365 ( [T]he C , d a i g  he Noerr-Pennington doctrine, clearly recognized that 
the right to petition the government for redress of grievances necessarily includes the right of access 
 he c .  (ci i g Cal. M  T a . C . . T cki g U limi ed, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); Bill 
J h  Re ., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983))). 
48. Id. at 1365 66 (ci i g A ch age J i  Ve e . A ch age C d . A , 670 P.2d 1249 
(Colo. App. 1983)).  
49. Id. a  1367 ( i g ha  [a] e e i i  a e  f ba ele  li iga i , i  he  d , i   
ece a  f  a lica i  f he ham e ce i  (ci i g MCI C mmc  C  . Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1153 55 (7th Cir. 1983))). 
50. Id. at 1368 (citing Note, Counterclaim and Countersuit Harassment of Private Environmental 
Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and Proposed Solutions, 74 MICH. L. REV. 106, 110 11 
(1975)). 
51. Id.; see, e.g., In re Foster, 253 P.3d 1244, 1251 (Colo. 2011) (requiring heightened standard 
under POME framework).  
52. Protect Our Mo a  E , I c., 677 P.2d at 1369 (citing COLO. R. CIV. P. § 12(b)); see also 
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analysis that courts should conduct in the wake of a potential SLAPP suit: 
[T]he plaintiff must make a sufficient showing to permit the court 
 ea abl  c cl de ha  he defe da  e i i i g ac i i ie  
were not immunized from liability under the First Amendment 
beca e: (1) he defe da  admi i a i e  j dicial claim  
were devoid of reasonable factual support, or, if so supportable, 
lacked any cognizable basis in law for their assertion; and (2) the 
ima  e f he defe da  e i i i g ac i i  was to 
harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper objective; 
a d (3) he defe da  e i i i g ac i i  had he ca aci   
adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.53 
The court then concluded that such a standard would need to be applied 
in the immediate case and that a motion to dismiss against the developers 
ought to be treated as one for summary judgment.54 Pring and Canan felt 
that the Colorado Supreme Court had adopted a workable system for 
adequately dismantling SLAPP claims.55 
B. Anti-SLAPP Statutes 
Washington State crafted one of the first anti-SLAPP statutes,56 which 
emerged in the wake of publicized litigation between homeowners and a 
real estate development company over its reported tax violations.57 Over 
time, the statute changed, but generally kept the same procedural 
mechanisms and purpose in preventing challenges to free speech.58 
However, the Washington Supreme Court struck down section 4.24.525 
of the Revised Code of Washington, one of its anti-SLAPP statutes, as 
                                                     
Makaeff . T m  U i ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9 h Ci . 2013) (ack ledgi g Calif ia  a i-
SLAPP law shifts substantive burden). But see Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, 
LLC, 885 F.3d 659, 670 (10 h Ci . 2018) ( i g ha  Ne  Me ic  a i-SLAPP a e d e   
al e  he le  f deci i  b  hich a c  ill adj dica e he me i  f he c m lai ).  
53. P ec  O  M a  E , I c., 677 P.2d at 1369 (noting that following this standard would 
 l    me i le  SLAPP claim , b  ld e mi  h e l  agg ie ed b  ab e f he e 
ce e   i dica e hei   legal igh ). 
54. Id. at 1370.  
55. See Pring & Canan, supra note 29, a  953 ( The POME e  i  a c e  ell h ad i g i  
he  j i dic i . ). 
56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2019). 
57. See Pring & Canan, supra note 29, at 959 n.53 (discussing the roots of the Washington anti-
SLAPP statute in the case of Robert John Real Estate Co. v. Hill, No. 87-2-01696-3 (Wash. Super. 
Ct. Clark Cnty. July 14, 1987)).  
58. See Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, A View from the First Amendment Trenches: 
Wa h g  S a e  Ne  P ec  f  P b c D c e a d De c ac , 87 WASH. L. REV. 495 
(2012).  
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unconstitutional.59 In particular, the Court took issue with the burden 
shifting effect that the statute has upon a plaintiff to prove that their case 
i  legi ima e a d ha  a likelih d f cce   clea  a d c i ci g 
e ide ce  i  e e  he special motion to strike.60 The Court found 
hi   be a i he ical i h he lai iff  igh   a j  ial.61 
California created its own statute, and Professors Pring and Canan 
ed i  1992 ha  he a e had ad ed he m  c m ehe i e a i-
SLAPP ac   da e. 62 Currently, twenty-seven states and Guam have 
some form of anti-SLAPP legislation in place.63 While these anti-SLAPP 
statutes vary in their strength and scope, all share the common tenet in 
idi g he c  i h he abili   de e mi e he he  he defe da  
ac i i  fall  i hi  he c e f he a e  li i g f ec ed ac i i ie  
igge i g he a e  c e age. 64 
While Pring and Canan, along with POME, offered a definite list of 
characteristics that anti-SLAPP statute legislation should incorporate, 
                                                     
59. See Davis v. Cox, 183 Wash. 2d 269, 296, 351 P.3d 862, 875 (2015), abrogated on other 
grounds by Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 191 Wash. 2d 392, 423 P.3d 223 (2018); 
see also Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 635 (Minn. 2017) (finding 
Mi e a  a i-SLAPP statute to be an unconstitutional erosion of state constitutional right for a 
trial by jury). 
60. See Davis, 183 Wash. 2d at 293, 351 P.3d at 873 (taking issue with the fact that the statute 
e i e  a babili  f cce  a  ial be d ha  i  a ia e de  Wa hi g  mma  
judgment standard beca e he ge i e e  f a [claim] d e     he he  i  cceed  
(quoting BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002))). 
61. Id.  
62. Pring & Canan, supra note 29, at 960 n.55 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 
1992)); see also United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 272 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring). 
63. The following states and territories have enacted the following anti-SLAPP legislation: ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to 12-752 (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to 16-63-508 (West 
2019); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2020); D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to 16-5505 (2001); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 8136 8138 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-11-11.1 (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 634F-1 to 63F-4 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. 
§§ 34-7-7-1 to 34-7-7-10 (West 2019); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2019); MD. CODE ANN. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, § 556 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 554.01, 554.03-554.05 (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241 to 246 (2016); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41.640 to 41.670 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-2-9.1 and 9.2 (West 2019); 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (Supp. 2015); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150 (West 2019); 27 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT ANN. §§ 27-83-8301 to 8305 
(West 2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (West 2019); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-
1001 to 4-21-1003 (West 2019); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001-27.011 (West 2020); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1402 to 1405 (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. § 1041 (West 2019); 7 GUAM 
CODE ANN. § 17101-17109 (2020). See also 2 RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9:109 n.1 
(2d ed. 2018). 
64. SMOLLA, supra note 63, § 9:109. 
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current statutes vary.65 F  e am le, Pe l a ia  a e a l  
e i e  ha  he SLAPP be i  ega d   e i i i g ac i i ie  ela i g  
e f ceme   im leme a i  f a  e i me al la   eg la i . 66 
In stark contrast, Calif ia  a e bjec  a  i  filed i  acc da ce 
i h a e  f he a ce f he e  igh  f e i i   f ee 
eech   a ecial m i   ike,  le  he SLAPP file  mee  a 
heigh e ed e ide ia  b de   h  he claim  legitimacy.67 Although 
the scope of each SLAPP statute will vary from state to state, the statutes 
share some common tenets.68 The special motions to dismiss are the core 
of these statutes, designed to extinguish a SLAPP suit before it has the 
chance to be litigated.69 Such motions are held to a 
mma -judgment-like ced e. 70 Unlike a Rule 12 or 56 motion, 
however, discovery is stayed, with the burden shifting first to the 
defendant to show that the suit arose to deter them from their legitimate 
petitioning activity, with the burden then shifting back to the plaintiff to 
show that the elements of his claim are supported by evidence.71 
When these suits take place in federal court, it is ultimately a question 
of whether, under the Erie doctrine, these motions are applicable at all 
since Rules 12 and 56 seem to encompass the same procedural function 
as state anti-SLAPP statutes.72 
                                                     
65. Canan and Pring discussed the POME elements and noted the following requirements for an 
anti-SLAPP statute:  
Procedural requirements - Every motion to dismiss based on the Petition Clause 1. Is to be 
fast-tracked for summary judgment. 2. Has the burden of proof shifted from the movant-target 
to he file  f he la i . 3. I   ha e a heigh e ed a da d  f e ie  ( ic  c i ) a lied. 
Substantive requirements - File  m  e ha  a ge  e i i i g ac i i : 1. Wa  de id f 
ea able fac al   lacked a  c g i able ba i  i  la ,  a d 2. Had a  i  ima  
e  ha a [me ]   me he  im e  bjec i e,  a d 3. Did [i ] ad e el  affec  a 
legal i e e  f file . 
Pring & Canan, supra note 29, a  952 (ci i g P ec  O  M ai  E , I c. . Di . C ., 677 P.2d 
1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984)). 
66. 27 P.A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (West 2019); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 
(2019) (maki g emed  l  a ailable  h e bei g ed b  a g e me al e i ).  
67. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2020).  
68. Saner, supra note 34, a  793, .82 (ci a i  mi ed) ( i g ha  [ ]he c e f a i-SLAPP 
la , h e e , a ie  b a iall  am g a e ).  
69. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West 2020). 
70. Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1205 (Cal. 2007).  
71. See Saner, supra note 34, at 792 93 (noting that a plaintiff who survives the special motion to 
strike might still be subject to a Rule 12 or 56 motion). But see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(b) 
(West 2019) (permitting a plaintiff to make a limited discovery request despite discovery being halted 
by the special motion to dismiss).  
72. See generally Joshua P. Zoffer, Note, An Avoidance Canon for Erie: Using Federalism to 
Resolve Shady Grove  Conflicts Analysis Problem, 128 YALE L.J. 482 (2018); Aaron Smith, Note, 
SLAPP Fight, 68 ALA. L. REV. 303 (2016); Laura Lee Prather & Jane Bland, Bullies Beware: 
Safeguarding Constitutional Rights Through Anti-SLAPP in Texas, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 725 (2015); 
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II. THE ERIE PROBLEM 
While the traditionally accepted facts of Erie have recently been 
challenged by Professor Brian Frye, the basic facts have been presented 
to generations of first-year law students.73 What happened to Harry James 
Tomkins on the evening of July 17, 1934 is both a quaint and tragic story. 
The facts seem almost ordinary, certainly not the type of story that would 
lead to the creation of a far reaching and revolutionary legal doctrine.74 
Yet, that is exactly what happened. 
According to Tomkins, his injury occurred as he walked along a 
footpath beside the tracks located in Pennsylvania. He claimed he had 
been struck by an open door swinging from one of the cars on a freight 
train operated by the Erie Railroad Company.75 The train that injured 
Tompkins was the Ashley Special No. 2499, a freight train operated by 
                                                     
Benjamin Ernst, Note, Fighting SLAPPs in Federal Court: Erie, the Rules Enabling Act, and the 
Application of State Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Diversity Actions, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1181 (2015); 
Caleb P. Lund, I  T e  SLAPP Bac : Wh  Ca f a  A -SLAPP Statute Should Not Apply in 
Federal Court, 44 SW. L. REV. 97 (2014); Quinlan, supra note 40, at 367; Saner, supra note 34, at 
792 93. 
73. Brian Frye, The Ballad of Harry James Tompkins, 52 AKRON L. REV. 531 (2018); see also Bob 
Rizzi, Erie Memoirs Reveal Drama, Tragedy, 63 HARV. L. REC. 2 (1976) (while this article is wildly 
i acc a e i  alm  e e  e ec , i  i cl de  e ce  f m Aa  L. Da ig  bli hed 
memoirs); Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1978) (relying on 
communications with Bernard Nemeroff and others, as well as a wide range of primary and secondary 
sources); Celebrating The Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins Project, 97 LUZERNE LEGAL REG. 1 
(2007),  https://docplayer.net/4106463-Published-weekly-by-the-wilkes-barre-law-library-
association.html [https://perma.cc/LKB8-JP36] (relying on secondary sources and local legend); 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics and Social Change 
Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (collecting 
information from a wide range of primary and secondary sources). 
74. As Frye describes these facts:  
At about 2:30 a.m. on Friday, July 27, 1934, William Colwell of Hughestown, Pennsylvania was 
awakened by two young men banging on his front door. When he went downstairs, they told him 
that someone had been run over by a train. Colwell looked out his side window. In the moonlight, 
he saw someone lying on the ground near the railroad tracks. He went back upstairs and told his 
ife ha  he e had bee  a  accide . She ld him   g  , ha  hem fell  a  c a ,  
but he dressed and went out to help anyway. 
C l ell  h e a  a  he b-end of Hughes Street, where it ran into the railroad tracks. When 
he reached the tracks, he discovered his neighbor Harry James Tompkins, about 6 or 10 feet 
south of Hughes Street. Tompkins had a deep gash on his right temple, and his severed right arm 
a  i  be ee  he ack . C l ell ld he g me   g   M . Re f d  h e d  he 
street and call an ambulance. After calling the ambulance, they disappeared.  Colwell also yelled 
to his neighbor, Aloysius Thomas McHale, who dressed and came out to help. Colwell and 
McHale stayed with Tompkins until the ambulance arrived at about 2:45 a.m. and took him to 
Pittston Hospital.  
Frye, supra note 73, at 532 33 (citing Transcript of Record at 115, 86 87, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1937) (No. 367)). 
75. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. 
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the Erie Railroad Company.76 Tompkins regained consciousness 
following the accident in the hospital receiving room.77 In treating him, 
the hospital doctors sedated him, treated the wound on his face, and 
amputated the remainder of his right arm.78 As a result of the accident, 
Tomkins spent about three weeks in the hospital. While in the hospital, he 
developed an infection in his shoulder, leading to the development of an 
abscess. Eventually, the wound healed.79 However, Tompkins continued 
to experience persistent phantom limb pain in his missing fingers.80 
T m ki s surgery cost about $350, with the hospital stay costing 
about $89.81 
Tompkins then filed a diversity action against Erie in federal court, 
presumably because the relevant federal common law was more favorable 
to him than the Pennsylvania rule. The key legal issue was the standard of 
care that the railroad Erie owed to Mr. Tompkins.82 The railroad argued 
that liability was governed by Pennsylvania law, which would treat 
Tompkins as a trespasser who could recover only if Erie acted with 
wanton or willful negligence (not mere negligence).83 Tompkins, on the 
other hand, asserted that a federal court was not bound by the decisions of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and was free to apply federal common 
law, which would not require Tomkins to show wanton or willful 
negligence in order to establish liability.84 The district court ruled for 
                                                     
76. Frye, supra note 73, at 533. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. Tompkins e ified ha  he d c  am a ed he cke . A. The  k m  a m igh   
f he cke . Q. Y  ha e  b  a hi g? A. O   cke ; he  k he cke  .  Id. 
However, the d c  ac all  e f med a h lde  di a ic la i ,  em i g he e i e h me  
a  he cke .  Id. at 533 n.5 (citing Transcript of Record, supra note 74, at 31 32). 
79. Id. at 533. 
80. Id. (citing Transcript of Record, supra note 74, at 31 32). 
81. Id. (citing Transcript of Record, supra note 74, at 16). 
82. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 71 (1938). 
83. Id. at 70. 
84. Id.; see also Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 255 58 (2008). The 
position advanced by Tompkins was based upon a Supreme Court case nearly a century earlier, Swift 
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 19 (1842). Id. According to Swift, federal courts exercising 
jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship were not required to apply the unwritten 
substantive law of the State as declared by its highest court. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18 19. In Swift, 
he C  c cl ded ha  fede al c  ma  e e ci e a  i de e de  j dgme  a   ha  he 
common law of the State is  h ld be.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (citing Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18
19). The doctrine announced by the Court in Swift was an interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 (Rules of Decision Act). Steinman, supra, a  255. The Ac  ide  ha  [ ]he la  f 
the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress 
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the 
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Tompkins on this issue, and he ultimately garnered a $30,000 verdict.85 
While Tompkins won at trial and on appeal, the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state 
substantive law.86 The C  deci i  a  c m le el  he alded a d 
e ec ed. 87 For almost a century, the Court had followed its opinion 
in Swift v. Tyson,88 holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should 
a l  ge e al  c mm  la , hich g ad all  became fede al  c mm  
law.89 However, after Erie, fede al ge e al c mm  la  a   m e.90 
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brandeis criticized Swift on several 
grounds. First, Brandeis asserted that in Swift, the Court had 
misinterpreted congressional intention when it adopted the Rules of 
Decision Act.91 Relying on the work of Charles Warren, a legal historian, 
Brandeis concluded that the legislative history of the Rules of Decision 
Act indicated that Congress intended for federal courts to follow rules of 
decision set forth by state courts as well as state legislatures.92 
Additionally, Brandeis was concerned about the potential consequences 
of Swift.93 Specifically, he worried ha  a ie  b a i e igh  ld 
be dependent upon whether the case was adjudicated in state court or 
fede al c , e e i g if mi  i  he admi i a i  f he la  f 
he a e. 94 Justice Brandeis was particularly concerned by the ease with 
which parties could manipulate the judicial system to obtain the benefits 
of the federal common law.95 
                                                     
U i ed S a e , i  ca e  he e he  a l .  Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (quoting the statute then-codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 725). In Swift, the Court concluded that:  
[T]he R le  f Deci i  Ac  e i ed fede al c   f ll  l  he i i e a e  f he 
a e,  [b ] did  e i e fede al c   f ll  deci i  b  a e c   e i  f a 
m e ge e al a e,   i e  f  hich a e c  im l  a ce ai ,  ge e al ea i g 
and legal analogies . . . what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to 
g e  he ca e.  
Steinman, supra, at 256 (quoting Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18 19). 
85. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. 
86. Id. at 71 80. 
87. Robert L. Stearns, Erie Railroad Versus Tompkins: One Year After, 12 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1939); see also Frye, supra note 73, at 533 (noting that, despite the surprising outcome, 
the Erie deci i  a  immedia el  he alded a  ig ifica [ ] ).   
88. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
89. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 78.  
90. Id. a  78 ( The e i   fede al ge e al c mm  la . ). 
91. Id. at 71. 
92. Id. at 72 73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51 52, 81 88, 108 (1923)). 
93. Id. at 74 75. 
94. Id. at 75. 
95. Id. at 73. Justice Brandeis offered the example of Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. 
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Even after offering these critiques, Brandeis concluded that they were 
insufficient to justify overruling Swift, given that its interpretation of the 
Rules of Decision Act had been widely applied and relied upon for almost 
a century.96 However, he asserted that Swift, beyond its statutory 
i fi mi ie , a  a  c i i al a m i  f e  b  the Courts 
of the United States, 97 stating: 
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
[A]cts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of 
the [S]tate. And whether the law of the [S]tate shall be declared 
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision 
is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general 
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules 
of common law applicable in a [S]tate . . . . And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal 
courts.98  
As a result, the Court held that in this case, a federal court must apply 
Pe l a ia  liabili  a da d  de e mi e T m ki s claim, even if 
that standard was articulated b  he a e  j dicia  ac i g a  a c mm  
law court.99 The Swift doctrine, which had allowed federal courts to do 
he i e, i aded igh  hich i   i i  a e e e ed b  he 
C i i   he e e al S a e . 100 
B. Years of Developing Maturity: From Erie to Shady Grove 
In the decades following the decision in Erie, the Court faced several 
cases that developed the Erie doctrine as we understand it now. In 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,101 the Court was faced with the 
question of whether the federal court should apply the New York statute 
of limitation.102 In its decision, the Court reaffirmed the principle that 
                                                     
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), where a Kentucky corporation 
reincorporated in Tennessee in order to manufacture diversity jurisdiction and thereby enforce in 
federal court a contract that would be void under the common law of Kentucky. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73
74. Brandeis pointed out that individual (non-corporate) litigants could manipulate diversity 
jurisdiction as well. Id. a  76 ( [I] di id al ci i e  illi g  em e f m hei   S a e a d 
bec me ci i e  f a he  migh  a ail hem el e  f he fede al le. ). 
96. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 77. 
97. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
98. Id. at 78. 
99. Id. at 80. 
100. Id.; see also Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 987, 996 97 (2011). 
101. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
102. Id. at 100 01. 
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federal courts enforce state substantive rights, but had no obligation to 
apply state procedural rules.103 In his opinion for the Court, Justice 
Frankfurter addressed the inadequacy of the distinction between substance 
and procedure in determining what law should be applied in a particular 
situation.104 He indicated that the appropriate governing principle was that 
a fede al c  c ld di ega d a a e la  ha  concerns merely the 
manner and the means by which a right to recover . . . i  e f ced. 105 
However, Frankfurter concluded that a federal court must follow state law 
where it significantly affects the result of the litigation.106 Guaranty Trust 
was seen as establi hi g a  c me-de e mi a i e  e  f  
Erie analysis.107 
However, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,108 the 
Court held that federal courts must follow the federal practice of allowing 
juries to determine issues of fact.109 The case involved the question of 
he he  a fede al c  m  f ll  S h Ca li a  e i eme  ha  a 
judge (not a jury) determine if a defendant is exempt from liability under 
S h Ca li a  W kme  C m e a i  Ac .110 In writing for the 
Court, Justice Brennan indicated that the Erie analysis was far more 
c m le  ha  he im le c me de e mi a i e  e  ha  had bee  
articulated in Guaranty Trust.111 According to Brennan, Erie required 
fede al c   e ec  he defi i i  f a e-created rights and 
obligation  b  he a e c ,  a  ell a  a e le  ha  a e b d  
i h  a e la  b a i e igh  a d bliga i .112 Brennan agreed with 
the reasoning in Guaranty Trust ha  he e a e la  ide  he f m 
a d m de  f  li iga i g a d de e mi i g a e substantive rights, Erie 
requires federal courts to consider whether the failure to apply that state 
law would have a substantial impact on the substantive outcome.113 
However, Brennan asserted that this impact on the outcome must be 
mea ed agai  he fac  ha  [ ]he fede al stem is an independent 
                                                     
103. Id. at 107 10. 
104. Id. at 108. 
105. Id. at 109. 
106. Id. 
107. Steinman, supra note 84, at 259. 
108. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
109. Id. at 540. 
110. Id. at 533 34. 
111. Id. at 539. 
112. Id. at 535. 
113. Id. at 536 37. 
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em f  admi i e i g j ice. 114 
The Court articulated the most significant and unified development in 
the methodology addressing the Erie problem in 1965 in Hanna v. 
Plumer.115 In Hanna, the Court faced a potential conflict between a state 
law that required in-hand delivery on the executor or administrator of an 
estate and the application of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which allowed methods of service in addition to in-hand 
delivery.116 In determining that the federal courts were not bound by the 
state law service of process methods, the Court adopted a bifurcated 
approach to the analysis of Erie questions. 
In writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren asserted that in situations 
where there was not a federal rule specifically concerned with the issue 
c e ed b  a e la  ( he g ided  Erie c e ) he c  a al i  
m  f c   he i  aim  f he E ie le: di c ageme  f f m-
h i g a d a ida ce f i e i able admi i a i  f he la  i  
determining whether to apply state or federal law.117 However, where the 
i e a  ha d i  ecificall  c e ed b  a fede al le ( he g ided  Erie 
context), the Court stated that a federal court must apply that federal rule 
unless the rule violates either the Rules Enabling Act (REA),118 the 
statutory authority for the federal rules, or the U.S. Constitution.119 Under 
he REA, he C  i  a h i ed  m lga e ge e al le  
e c ibi g he ac ice a d ced e  f he di ic  c  f he 
United States in civil actions.120 However, the REA states that those 
ge e al le  hall  ab idge, e la ge  m dif  a  
substantive igh . 121 
Following Hanna, the analysis of an Erie issue has basically remained 
the same, in that the federal court looks first to see if there is a conflict 
between the federal rule and state law. Where a conflict exists, the federal 
court must apply the federal rule if it is determined to be valid under the 
                                                     
114. Id. at 537. 
115. 380 U.S. 460, 461 (1965); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 
(1996) (calling Hanna a a hma ki g ca e ). 
116. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. 
117. Id. at 468. 
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
119. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). 
121. § 2072(b). Interestingly, several commentators criticized the outcome of Hanna in the years 
following the decision. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 
718 20 (1974); John C. McCoid II, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. 
REV. 884, 901 03 (1965); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie The Thread, 87 HARV. 
L. REV. 1682, 1687 (1974). 
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Constitution and the REA. Where there is no conflict between the federal 
rule and state law, the federal court is to weigh the federal policies of the 
federal rule against the twin concerns of Erie, the di c ageme  f 
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable admi i a i  f he la ,  
in determining whether to apply state or federal law.122 Following Hanna, 
the existence or absence of a conflict is often the ultimate disputed 
question in the Erie analysis. 
For example, in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,123 the Court was faced 
with a decision to apply a state law, which deemed an action commenced 
for purposes of its statutes of limitation when service was made, or Rule 
3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which deemed an action 
commenced when the complaint is filed.124 Here, the Court framed the 
i e a  he he  he c e f he Fede al R le i  fac  i  fficie l  b ad 
 c l he i e. 125 In answering that question, the Court held that the 
 i i  ca  e i  ide b  ide . . . each controlling its own 
i e ded he e f c e age i h  c flic . 126 Acc di g  he C  
analysis, Rule 3 g e  he da e f m hich a i  imi g 
requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state 
a e  f limi a i . 127 The state la , b  c a , a  a a eme  f 
a substantive decision . . . that actual service on, and accordingly actual 
notice by, the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served 
b  he a e f limi a i . 128 
Conversely, in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,129 the 
Court addressed a potential conflict between a state law, which mandated 
a 10% penalty on any money judgment affirmed on appeal and Rule 38 of 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which permitted appellate 
judges to impose e al ie   f i l  a eal .130 In analyzing the Erie 
e i , he C  a e ed ha  fede al le  c ld be fficie l  
b ad  ei he  b  ca i g a di ec  c lli i  i h he a e la   b  
                                                     
122. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 747 (1980); 
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 415 16 (2010). 
123. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
124. Id. at 741. 
125. Id. at 749 50. 
126. Id. at 752. 
127. Id. at 751. 
128. Id. 
129. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
130. Id. at 3 4 (first citing ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986); and then citing FED. R. APP. P. 38). 
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c l[li g] he i e,  lea i g  m  f  he ate law to operate.131 
In Burlington Northern, he C  c cl ded ha  he fede al le  
di c e i a  m de f e a i  mi akabl  c flic  i h he 
ma da  i i  f Alabama  affi ma ce e al  a e, 132 and that 
he fede al le  e  e e al  fficie l  c e e i e  i h he 
a e la  e   i dica e ha  he R le cc ie  he a e  field 
f e a i . 133 
C. Shady Grove: A Mature Doctrine? 
As discussed above, federal courts sitting in diversity have struggled to 
determine whether state or federal law should apply for over a century. 
While it is well established that a federal court sitting in diversity applies 
state substantive law and federal procedural rules, the line between 
substance and procedure continues to confound courts.134 
Most recently, the Supreme Court again struggled with this question in 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P fe a  A  v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.,135 where the Court faced a potential conflict between 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a New York statute.136 
The conflict in Shady Grove arose out of a New York state law that 
                                                     
131. Id. at 4 5 (first citing Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 50, 750 n.9; and then citing Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 471 72 (1965)). 
132. Id. at 7. 
133. Id. 
134. See Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1227 (2016); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intersystemic S a  I e e a : Me h d g  a  La  a d he Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 
1898, 1970 (2011) ( [S] a  i e e a i  me h d l g  migh  be de d a  a e  f le  ha  
ide  c  i h a ea i g ce . ); Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of 
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041, 1059 63 (2011) (explaining how Justice Stevens distinguished 
Sibbach and arguing that he was correct, further illustrating the contrasting positions taken by various 
interpreters of Erie); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing 
Benefits of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 916 17 (2011) (ill a i g J ice Scalia  
f mali  a ach a d c a i g i  i h J ice Gi b g  ece a  . . . judicial reflection 
e  he im a ce  a a ic la  la   he a e ); Adam N. S ei ma , Our Class Action 
Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 
1136 (2011) ( Like i e, eci e g ida ce ha  bee  lacki g f  b h he i  aim  a da d ha  
g e  g ided E ie ch ice  a d he REA  b a i e-rights provision that governs the validity 
f a Fede al R le. ); S e he  B. B bank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25 26 (2010) ( i g he i ce i e f  
e ai ed i e e a i  f he Fede al R le   a id e e i g he b da ie  f fede al 
lawmaking authority); Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady 
Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 34 (2010) ( i i g  he C  lack f a c he e  he  f 
he  fede al a d a e le  c llide ). 
135. 559 U.S. 393, 396 97 (2010). 
136. Id. 
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hibi ed cla  ac i  i  i  eeki g e al ie   a y minimum 
damage . 137 Shady Grove asserted that Allstate Insurance owed unpaid 
statutory interest to itself and a class of others similarly situated.138 If the 
New York state law applied, then any consideration of statutory interest 
for the members of the class was barred.139 If this were the case, then 
Shad  G e s claim would fail to meet the amount in controversy 
requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction.140 However, if Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied, then there would be no bar 
on the federal court having diversity jurisdiction over the class action 
based on statutory interest.141 In short, if the New York law controlled the 
suit, then Shad  G e  claim would not be able to proceed as a class 
action; but if the New York law did not control, then a federal court could 
have jurisdiction over the matter under Rule 23.142 The Court held that 
Rule 23, rather than the New York statute, applied, though it split 
somewhat in its reasoning.143 
In rejecting the assertion that the New York statute should be applied 
beca e f he b a i e igh  i  ec , he C  ed ha  [a] 
Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in 
others or valid in some cases and invalid in others depending upon 
whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law (or a state 
ced al la  e ac ed f  b a i e e ). 144 The Court found 
support in precedent that established that if a federal rule was valid under 
                                                     
137. Id. at 396; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) ( U le  a statute creating or imposing a 
penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class 
action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute 
may not be maintained as a cla  ac i . ). 
138. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398 99. 
142. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398 99; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006). 
143. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. 
144. Id. at 409. The court noted the following:  
The e i i e  a  he h a e [ b a i e igh  i  he Rules Enabling Act] connotes more; 
that by its use Congress intended that in regulating procedure this Court should not deal with 
important and substantial rights theretofore recognized. Recognized where and by whom? The 
state courts are divided as to the power in the absence of statute to order a physical examination. 
In a number such an order is authorized by statute or rule. . . . The asserted right, moreover, is 
no more important than many others enjoyed by litigants in District Courts sitting in the several 
states before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered and abolished old rights or privileges 
and created new ones in connection with the conduct of litigation. . . . If we were to adopt the 
suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged right we should invite endless litigation and 
confusion worse confounded. The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure. 
Id. at 409 10 (alterations in original) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 14 (1941)).  
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the limits set forth in the REA, then it was constitutional.145 The majority 
found that appealing to the substantive nature of the statutes confounded 
the issue.146 Furthermore, requiring judges to laboriously pore over state 
legislative records to determine the intention behind the statute would 
most likely prove to be inefficient and unrewarding.147 
1. J ce Sca a  E a e A ach 
Writing for the Court in Parts I and II-A of the opinion, Justice Scalia 
first determined that the state law and federal rule conflicted and that the 
fede al le h ld be a lied beca e i  eall  eg la e  ced e. 148 
In determining whether a state law and a federal rule are in conflict,149 
Scalia indicated that a conflict exists where the reach of the federal rule is 
sufficiently broad, he e he e  f he fede al le lea e   m f  
special exemptions based on the function or purpose of a particular state 
le. 150 Scalia defined the question before the Court as whether the 
lawsuit could proceed as a class action.151 Under Rule 23, the answer was 
e . 152 U de  he Ne  Y k la , he a e  a  . 153 Based on this 
analysis, Scalia concluded that both the federal rule and the state law 
de iabl  gh   a e  he ame e i ,  maki g i  im ible 
                                                     
145. Id. at 410 ( [T]he c  ha  bee  i c ed  a l  he Fede al R le, a d ca  ef e  d   
only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the 
Rule in question t a g e e  ei he  he e m  f he E abli g Ac   c i i al e ic i .  
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965))). 
146. See id. a  404 ( The di e  a ach f de e mi i g hether state and federal rules conflict 
based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce 
c f i  e c f ded.  ( i g Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14)). 
147. Id. The court notes: 
[D]istrict courts would have to discern, in every diversity case, the purpose behind any putatively 
pre-empted state procedural rule, even if its text squarely conflicts with federal law. That task 
will often prove arduous. Many laws further more than one aim, and the aim of others may be 
impossible to discern. 
Id. But see Mark DeForrest, Taming a Dragon: Legislative History in Legal Analysis, 39 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 37, 49 (2013) (finding that the Internet has made legislative history more available, which 
makes it more relevant when interpreting a statute). 
148. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). 
149. Id. at 398 406. 
150. Id. a  421 (S e e , J., c c i g i  a  a d c c i g i  he j dgme ) (J ice S e e  
concurrence succinctly phrased this inquiry as whethe  he c e f he fede al le i  fficie l  
b ad   c l he i e  bef e he c , he eb  lea i g  m f  he e a i  f eemi gl  
c flic i g a e la  (first quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 5 (1987); and 
then quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 50, 750 n.9 (1980))). 
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for them to operate alongside each other.154 
After concluding that a conflict existed, Scalia, writing for a plurality 
of the Court in Parts II-B through II-D, turned to the question of whether 
the federal rule was a valid exercise of the federal rulemaking power under 
the REA.155 U de  he REA, he C  i  gi e  he e   e c ibe 
general [federal] rules of practice and procedure, 156 but those federal 
le  hall  ab idge, e la ge  m dif  a  b a i e igh . 157 
According to Scalia, a federal rule is valid under the REA so long as it 
eall  eg la e  ced e. 158 
U de  Scalia  a al i , he b a i e cha ac e i ic  e f he 
a e la  make   diffe e ce. 159 Even where, as in Shady Grove, the 
state law has the practical effect of limiting or expanding the pa  igh  
a d emedie , he a e la  eg la e[ ] l  he ce  f  e f ci g 
h e igh  a d  he b a i e igh  hem el e .160 For Scalia, the 
importance of this approach was in the ease of administration and the 
resulting uniformity.161 He argued that this was true, even though it is 
ha d  a e  he a lica i  i h he la g age f he REA.162 Thus, 
Scalia concluded that Rule 23 really regulates the procedure of class 
actions and thus is valid under the REA.163 
2. J ce S e e  Na  C nflict Avoidance Approach 
While J ice S e e  c c ed i h Scalia  c cl i , he di ag eed 
with his analysis and the breadth of his conclusion.164 Joining a portion of 
                                                     
154. Id. at 401. 
155. Id. at 409. 
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). 
157. Id. § 2072(b). 
158. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
159. Id. at 409 (emphasis omitted). 
160. Id. at 407. 
161. See id. a  413 ( i g ha  hi  ced al e  a  d i e  b  he e  eal c ce  ha  Fede al 
R le  hich a  f m S a e  S a e ld be cha  (ci i g Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14)). 
162. Id. 
163. See id. at 408 09 (implying that FRCP 23, which here turns ten thousand five-hundred dollar 
claims into a single five-milli  d lla  claim, d e   b a iall  affec  he lai iff  emedie  a d 
thus eall  eg la e  ced e ); see also Mark P. Gaber, Maintaining Uniform Federal Rules: Why 
the Shady Grove Plurality Was Right, 44 AKRON L. REV. 979, 984 91 (2011) (recognizing the 
inherent conflict between the New York law and Rule 23 in Shady Grove and framing the issue within 
J ice Scalia  i  f ie ). 
164. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 431 36 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). In determining whether any opinion would be controlling in this situation, subsequent 
courts would look to the decision of the Court in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), for 
guidance. In Marks, the Court addressed the question of how to count the votes of the justices to 
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Scalia  i i , S e e  ag eed ha  he Ne  Y k la  c flic  i h 
Rule 23.165 He also agreed with Scalia that Rule 23 was a valid exercise 
of rulemaking authority under the REA.166 What Stevens rejected was 
Scalia  eall  eg la e  ced e  a ach, a g i g ha  he a ach 
was unfaithful to the text of the REA.167 F  S e e , he ba  f  fi di g 
a  [REA] blem i  a high e, 168 e i i g m e ha  a me e 
possibility that a federal rule would alter a state-c ea ed igh . 169 
For Stevens, a valid exercise of federal rulemaking meant that the 
federal rule could not di lace a a e la  ha  i  ced al b  i   
intertwined with a state right or remedy that [the state law] functions to 
define the scope of the state-c ea ed igh . 170 U like Scalia  a ach, 
Stevens argued that the proper analysis must look beyond the federal rule 
itself to the substantive and extrinsic policy reasons behind the state 
                                                     
decide who won a Supreme Court case and on what rationale when there is a plurality opinion and no 
clear holding from the Court. Id. at 193. The Court offered a rule to guide lower courts in answering 
that question: when no single opinion is supported by a majority of the Court, the holding of the Court 
the rests in the opinion decided on the narrowest grounds. Id. The le a ed ha  [ ]he  a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
J ice , he h ldi g f he C  ma  be ie ed a  ha  i i  ake  b  he Membe  h  
c c ed i  he j dgme   he a e  g d .  Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n.15 (1976)). 
H e e , ega di g S e e s opinion in Shady Grove, Marks appears inapplicable. As then Judge 
Kavanaugh asserted in Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC, 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015), the 
correct method of applying Marks is to identify the logical middle ground between the concurrence 
and the dissent when no single position garners the support of five members of the Court. Id. at 1337. 
See generally Marks, 430 U.S. 188. Cf. United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 609 11 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Ka a a gh a lied hi  a al i   S e e  i i  i  Shady 
Grove to determine whether the appropriate test for whether a given federal rule was a valid exercise 
f lemaki g de  he REA a  he a ach ad ed b  Scalia ( eall  eg la e  ced e )  
the approach adopted by Stevens (determining whether the state law is so intertwined with a state 
right or remedy that [the state law] functions to define the scope of the state-c ea ed igh . ). Abbas, 
783 F.3d at 1337; Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 1452. In answering this question in Abbas, Kavanaugh 
asserted that beca e four Justices adopted one formulation[; o]ne Justice adopted a different 
formulation[;] . . . [a] d f  J ice  did  add e  he e i ,   c lli g i i  eme ged 
from Shady Grove under Marks. I  he face f hi  e l ed 4-1 di ag eeme ,  Ka a a gh 
concluded that the appropriate thing for a c   d  i  these particular circumstances, is to follow 
he S eme C  e-existing precedent in Sibbach,  h ldi g ha  he g e i g e  de  he 
REA was whether the rule in question eall  eg la e  ced e.  Ka a a gh c cl ded ha  
[ ] le  a d il he S eme C  e le   a  i  deci i  i  Sibbach, that case remains 
g d la  a d i  bi di g  l e  c .  Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1336 37. 
165. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
166. Id. at 431 36. 
167. Id. at 424 25. 
168. Id. at 432. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 423. 
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law.171 U de  S e e s approach, the role of the federal court is to 
de e mi e he he  he a e la  ac all  i  a  f a S a e  f ame k 
of substantive rights or remedie . 172 If it is, then the federal rule is valid 
only where it does not intrude into those substantive rights.173 In Shady 
Grove, Stevens concluded that Rule 23 did not intrude on state substantive 
igh , i  ha  he Ne  Y k la  i    b d up with [a] state-created 
igh   emed . 174 Therefore, according to Stevens, Rule 23 is a valid 
exercise of rulemaking authority and should be applied in lieu of the New 
York statute.175 
3. J ce G b g  I e ec a  C f c  A da ce A ach 
Justice Ginsburg dissented, asserting that the New York state law 
should apply both because it furthers the equality of litigants and because 
no conflict exists between the state law and the federal rule.176 Ginsburg 
agreed with Scalia and Stevens that the first question the court must 
address is whether the federal rule leaves no room for the operation of the 
state law.177 However, unlike the approaches urged by Scalia and Stevens, 
Ginsburg inserted a basic threshold question. She argued that the initial 
question should be whether a conflict between the state law and federal 
le i  eall  ece a . 178 According to Ginsburg, a court should 
approach questions like those raised in Shady Grove i h a igila [] 
read[ing] [of] the Federal Rules to avoid conflict with state la . 179 By 
employing this approach, Ginsburg argued that often such a conflict is 
                                                     
171. See id. at 429 36 (outlining the legislative history and possible interpretations of the New 
York law). 
172. Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But see Gaber, 
supra note 163, a  995 ( gge i g J ice S e e  i i  i  mi g ided he e he c ld  c me 
 i h a ele a  ced al a e la  ha  i   i e e  i h a a e  b a i e la   j if  
his position).  
173. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 424 25 (citations omitted) (criticizing Justice Scalia for ignoring 
he bala ce ha  C g e  ck be ee  if m le  f fede al ced e a d e ec  f  a S a e  
c c i  f i   igh  a d emedie  a d he e a a i -of-powers presumption, and 
federalism presumption, that counsel against judicially created rules displacing state substantive 
la ). 
174. Id. at 420. 
175. See id. a  432 ( I  i  . . . hard to see how [the New York law] could be understood as a rule 
ha , h gh ced al i  f m, e e  he f c i  f defi i g Ne  Y k  igh   emedie . ). 
176. Id. at 445 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
177. Id. at 439. 
178. Id. at 437 (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 
(1959)). 
179. Id. at 439. 
 
Harrison_Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:51 PM 
1278 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1253 
 
simply unnecessary.180 In reviewing the text of the federal rule and the 
purpose and legislative history of the New York law,181 Justice Ginsburg 
concluded that Rule 23 and the New York law serve different goals.182 On 
one hand, Rule 23 addresses certification of class actions.183 On the other 
hand, the New York law focuses on remedies, specifically statutory-
damages caps.184 
To avoid conflict, Justice Ginsburg moved away from the traditional 
REA analysis towards the alternative unguided Erie analysis articulated 
in Hanna.185 Employing an unguided Erie analysis should force a court to 
look closely to determine if the state law is inseparably connected with an 
underlying substantive state right. According to Ginsburg, an affirmative 
answer to that question strongly supports applying the state law.186 On the 
other hand, if the application of state law would alter or disrupt an 
essential characteristic of the federal court system, then this disruption 
strongly supports applying the federal rule or practice.187 Ginsburg also 
stressed the importance of the twin aims of Erie in this analysis, in that 
                                                     
180. See id. a  442 ( I  m, b h bef e a d af e  Hanna, the above-described decisions show, 
fede al c  ha e bee  ca i ed b  hi  C   i e e[ ] he Fede al R le  . . . with sensitivity 
 im a  a e i e e  . . . a d a ill  a id c flic  i h im a  a e eg la  licie .  
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 438 n.22 (1996))). 
181. See id. at 437 39, 443, 448 .7 (c i ici i g he l ali  i terpretation of Rule 23 as 
mecha ical,  i e i i e,  a d ele le ). 
182. Id. a  447 ( R le 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for relief, while [the New York 
law] defines the dimension  f he claim i elf. ); id. a  446 ( The C  . . . finds conflict where none 
i  ece a . ). 
183. Id. at 447. 
184. Id. 
185. The h a e ela i el  g ided Erie ch ice  i  d a  f m Hanna. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 471 (1965). In Hanna, the Court stressed that when there is no federal rule or statute on 
i , he ical, elatively unguided Erie ch ice  c l . Id. J ice S e e  c c i g i i  
in Shady Grove also briefly addressed this relatively unguided approach. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 
416 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). However, Justice Ginsburg went 
into much detail about this approach in Shady Grove but did not use the h a e ela i el  g ided  
to describe her framework. Id. at 452 58 (Gi b g, J., di e i g) ( [S] a e  alif  a  
b a i e  f  Erie e  e e  he  he  ha e ced al  h  a  ell.  (ci i g C he  . 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949)). 
186. See Shady Grove, 539 U.S. at 457 58 (Gi b g, J., di e i g) ( We ha e l g ec g i ed 
the impropriety of displacing, in a diversity action, state-law limitations on state-c ea ed emedie .  
(citing Woods, 337 U.S. at 538)). 
187. See id. a  439 ( I   i  deci i  i  i , ma  f hem  me i ed i  he C  
opinion, we have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench on state 
prerogatives with  e i g a  c e aili g fede al i e e . ); see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (concluding that the constitutional right to a jury trial and 
the corresponding federal policy was an essential characteristic of the federal court system that 
outweighed a South Carolina law requiring a judge to decide whether an employer was immune from 
liability). 
 
Harrison_Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:51 PM 
2020] ERIE SLAPP BACK 1279 
 
the federal rule should apply only when it (1) will not lead to forum 
shopping and (2) avoids the inequitable administration of justice.188 
I  he  a al i , Gi b g em ha i ed sensitivity to important state 
interests 189 and deference to state regulatory interests.190 Regarding the 
specific issue raised in Shady Grove, Ginsburg concluded that New York 
had a strong interest in prohibiting statutory damages in class actions and 
that the New York law was inseparably intertwined with important state 
rights, making application of the New York law appropriate.191 
D. After Shady Grove, Then What? 
The opinions in Shady Grove left many important questions 
unanswered. For example, when a court decides whether the federal rule 
i  fficie l  b ad   c l he i e  bef e he c ,  h  
broadly is the court to frame the issue and construe the federal rule at 
issue?192 Also, are courts to focus on the guided REA analysis, as required 
de  Scalia  a ach, or employ the unguided analysis asserted by 
Ginsburg? Further, in determining whether a federal rule really regulates 
ced e, h ld he f c  i  Scalia  REA a al i  be he e  f he 
REA itself? Finally, how is a court to determine whether or not a state law 
i   i e i ed i h a a e igh   emed  ha  [ he a e la ] f c i  
to define the scope of the state-c ea ed igh ?193 
This lack of clarity over the appropriate approach to an Erie analysis 
has led to inconsistent application in federal courts, even when addressing 
primarily the same issue.194 Courts faced with Erie questions have, at 
                                                     
188. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438 39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that federal 
c  m  a l  a e la  he  fail e  d   ld i i e f m-shopping and yield markedly 
di a a e li iga i  c me ). 
189. Id. at 442 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)). 
190. See id. at 438 43 (listing past decisions in which the Supreme Court deferred to state 
interests); see also Michael S. Green, The Erie Doctrine: A Flowchart, 52 AKRON L. REV. 215, 243 
(2018) (ack ledgi g ha  J ice Gi b g  a ach ha  he be efi  f h i g e ect for state 
a d f eig  eg la  i e e , b  i  g ea l  i c ea e  he admi i a i e b de   fede al c ).  
191. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 452 58. 
192. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Burlington 
N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 5 (1987)). 
193. Id. at 423. 
194. See Jack E. Pace III & Rachel J. Feldman, From Shady to Dark: One Year Later, Shady 
Grove  Mea g Re a  U c ea , 25 ANTITRUST 75, 78 80 (2011) (summarizing how lower courts 
have reached different conclusions in cases involving similar facts). Compare Van Dyke v. Retzlaff, 
No. 4:18-CV-247, 2018 WL 4261193, at *2 3 (E.D. Tex. July 24, 2018) (refusing to apply Texas 
anti-SLAPP law in federal court in defamation case), aff d, 781 F. A . 368 (5 h Ci . 2019), with 
Floyd v. Aalaei, No. 4:15CV525-RC-DDB, 2016 WL 11472821, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2016) 
(applying Texas anti-SLAPP law in federal court in defamation case). 
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times, concluded that a conflict exists between state law and federal rules 
a d ha e f ll ed J ice Scalia  eall  eg la e  ced e  
approach.195 On the other hand, other courts faced with similar Erie 
e i  ha e f ll ed J ice S e e  a ach, eeki g to determine 
he he  he a e la  a  i e a   i e i ed i h a a e igh   
remedy that [the state law] functions to define the scope of the state-
c ea ed igh . 196 S ill he  ha e f ll ed J ice Gi b g  ela i el  
unguided approach and avoided finding conflict by conducting a 
igila [] ead[i g] [ f] he Fede al R le   a id c flic  i h 
state la . 197 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE ERIE DOCTRINE TO ANTI-
SLAPP STATUTES 
This Part examines how federal courts of appeals have sought to make 
sense of Shady Grove in the context of state anti-SLAPP laws. What we 
have seen is that federal courts of appeals, when faced with the same basic 
legal question and with a nearly identical state law, have adopted different 
approaches, coming to varying and inconsistent conclusions.198 John Hart 
Ely, in describing the analytical struggle by courts to determine the 
boundary between procedure and substance, asserts that a procedural rule 
                                                     
195. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410. See, e.g., Jones v. UPS, Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1206 (10th Cir. 
2012) (fi di g c flic  a d e ami i g he e  f he fede al le); D mi hi . Na l Ca . C ., 
720 F. Supp. 2d 862, 876 77 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (same); see also O Ga a . Bi kle , 384 F. S . 3d 
674, 684 (N.D. Te . 2019) ( i g Abba  . F eig  P l  G ., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015)) (finding that Texas anti-SLAPP law did not apply in federal defamation claim); Intercon 
Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1051 53 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff d, 791 F.3d 
729 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that anti-SLAPP la  did  a l  i  fede al c  he e i  b a i e 
purpose . . . make   diffe e ce  for the purposes of determining whether the law is in conflict with 
he Fede al R le  (em ha i  mi ed) ( i g Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 409)).  
196. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423. See, e.g., Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 
977, 983 85 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding conflict and examining the purposes of the state law); In re 
Estate of C.A. v. Grier, 752 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (same); Steinmetz v. Coyle & 
Caron, Inc., No.: 15-cv-13594-DJC, 2016 WL 4074135, at *3 (D. Mass. July 29, 2016) (same). 
197. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 439. See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 335
37 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding no conflict); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1278 80 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (same). 
198. For example, in Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 791 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015), 
J dge Ea e b k dela ed decidi g he he  Wa hi g  a i-SLAPP provision applied in federal 
court in a defamation case between Intercon Solutions, a recycling company, and Basel Action 
Network, a company Intercon hired to certify it as an environmentally friendly organization. Id. at 
732. When the Washington Supreme C  ck d  Wa hi g  a i-SLAPP provision, 
Ea e b k decided ha  he a e  a licabili  a   l ge  h me i i g, de i e he 
di ic  c  de ailed a ack n anti-SLAPP a e  a lica i  i  fede al c . Id. at 731 32; 
Intercon Sols., 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 49. 
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i  one designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient 
mechanism for the resolution of di e  hile a b a i e le  
more particularly a substantive right, which is what the Act refers to is 
as a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some 
purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the 
li iga i  ce . 199 
Some have argued that anti-SLAPP statutes are bound up in substantive 
rights in the same manner that Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg may 
have envisioned.200 Nonetheless, under Shady Grove, the crux of the issue 
is whether the procedural mechanism of the SLAPP statute covers the 
same procedural ground as Rules 12 and 56.201 In particular, a Rule 56 
m i  f  mma  j dgme  a lie  ge e all ,  hich ld i cl de 
the scope of the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss.202 Furthermore, there is 
seemingly no reading of the statutes and the rules possible to avoid a 
collision.203 Still, a common argument in support of applying anti-SLAPP 
                                                     
199. Ely, supra note 121, at 724 25. As Ely notes: 
We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance and 
procedure. But the realization that the terms carry no monolithic meaning at once appropriate to 
all the contexts in which courts have seen fit to employ them need not imply that they can have 
no meaning at all. And they are the terms the Enabling Act uses. We have, I think, some 
moderately clear notion of what a procedural rule is one designed to make the process of 
litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes. Thus, one way of doing 
things may be chosen over another because it is thought to be more likely to get at the truth, or 
better calculated to give the parties a fair opportunity to present their sides of the story, or 
because, and this may point quite the other way, it is a means of promoting the efficiency of the 
process. Or the protection of the process may proceed at wholesale, as by keeping the size of the 
docket at a level consistent with giving those cases that are heard the attention they deserve. The 
most helpful way, it seems to me, of defining a substantive rule or more particularly a 
substantive right, which is what the Act refers to is as a right granted for one or more 
nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or 
efficiency of the litigation process. 
Id. 
200. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 428 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)); Guar. Tr. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 
(1945)) ( P  a he  a , e e  if a fede al le i  m  ca e  eall  eg la e  ced e,  i  does 
 eall  eg la [e] ced e  he  i  di lace  h e a e a e le  ha , al h gh ced al  i  
the ordinary sense of the term, operate to define the rights and remedies available in a case. This is so 
because what is procedural in one contex  ma  be b a i e i  a he .  ( i g Sibbach . Wil  
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)); see also Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 87 88 (1st Cir. 2010). 
201. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. a  410 ( [I]t is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose 
f he affec ed a e la  ha  ma e , b  he b a i e  ced al a e f he Fede al R le. ); 
see also Tyler J. Kimberly, Note, A SLAPP Back on Track: How Shady Grove Prevents the 
Application of Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Courts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1201, 1231 (2015). 
202. Kimberly, supra note 201, a  1233 (fi di g ha  beca e mma  j dgme  a lie  
generally, it must also apply to specific cases where anti-SLAPP a e  ec  a defe da  igh  
 e i i ).  
203. See Smith, supra note 72, at 321 (finding that the Rules and anti-SLAPP statutes share the 
ame bjec  ma e  a d he heigh e ed b de  i  a i-SLAPP statutes makes it incompatible with 
the rules); see also Abbas v. F eig  P l  G ., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Ci . 2015) ( B  
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statutes in federal court is that the interest of the state is the protection of 
the right to speak, unlike the purpose of Rule 12 and 56 motions, which 
seem purely procedural.204 
In reply, some courts have found that anti-SLAPP statutes, while 
cl aked i  b a i e la g age, me el  ide[] a ced al 
mechanism for vindica i g e i i g igh . 205 These state statutes cover 
the same ground and answer the same questions as the federal rules and 
therefore ought to be treated as conflicting. Unless there is some 
legi ima e challe ge  he b ead h f he REA  a h i , the rules 
should apply rather than the state statute,206 allowing the purpose of the 
state statutes to be appropriately served by Rule 12 and Rule 56.207 
Where, as Ely correctly asserts, a substantive rule is defined as granting 
a igh  f  e  m e ced al reasons, for some purpose . . . not 
ha i g  d  i h he fai e   efficie c  f he li iga i  ce ,  i  
becomes apparent that the anti-SLAPP a e  e i e ce i e fe e  i h 
the ability of the federal procedural rules to maintain federal courts as a 
fair place devoid of wasteful suits.208 The federal rules arguably remain 
the best mechanism for maintaining this fairness in federal courts. The 
alternative would be to allow state legislatures to strip from the federal 
court and Congress of the ability to govern procedure in federal courts, 
ca i g ece a  diffic l  b  f ci g fede al c   a e  he 
substantive or procedural character of countless state rules that may 
                                                     
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 a d 56 a e  he ame e i  ab  he ci c m a ce  de  
which a court must dismiss a case before trial. And those Federal Rules answer the question 
diffe e l : The  d   e i e a lai iff  h  a likelih d f cce   he me i . ); Kl cke . 
Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2019).  
204. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 447 48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Ely, supra note 121, 
at 722); Lisa Litwiller, A SLAPP in the Face: Why Principles of Federalism Suggest That Federal 
District Courts Should Stop Turning the Other Cheek, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 67, 91 (2008) (finding 
ha  he a e  e  a e  ec  a defe da  e i i i g ac i i  f m bei g de e ed b  he 
expense of discovery); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999). 
205. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) 
( i g ha  he Calif ia S eme Court has characterized [its anti-SLAPP a e] a  a ced al 
de ice  c ee   me i le  claim  ( i g Kible  . N. I  C . L c. H . Di ., 138 P.3d 
193, 198 (Cal. 2006))); see also Klocke, 936 F.3d at 248. 
206. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 66 (1965); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 5.3, at 343 45 (6th ed. 2012). 
207. See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1338 40 (di mi i g lai iff  claim  i h ej dice de  
Rule 12(b)(6), thereby having the same effect on the case as would applying the anti-SLAPP statute 
minus the fee-shifting provision); Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1349 57 
(11th Cir. 2018). 
208. Ely, supra note 121, at 725. 
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c flic  i h a i gle Fede al R le. 209 
A. Circuits Applying Anti-SLAPP Motions in Federal Court 
1. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Well bef e he S eme C  deci i  i  Shady Grove, the Ninth 
Circuit resolved this question in 1999 in United States ex rel. Newsham v. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.210 However, while the Ninth Circuit 
continued to apply state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court after Shady 
Grove, a recent case suggests that Shady Grove has cast some doubt on 
Newsham  h ldi g. 
In Newsham, plaintiffs, acting in qui tam211 on behalf of the United 
States, sued Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (LMSC) for allegedly filing 
false claims to the United States government to recover for excessive non-
labor productive costs.212 Plaintiffs were former employees of Lockheed 
and charged the company with inflating their contract hours by including 
ime e   em l ee  e al a d d c i e ac i i ie  i  
violation of the False Claims Act (FCA).213 In response, LMSC filed 
numerous counterclaims alleging that the realtors breached their duties of 
good faith and fiduciary obligations.214 
The court first addressed the history of the anti-SLAPP statute in 
California, section 425.16 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 
noting that it was enacted in order to protect those exercising their First 
Amendment rights from malicious suits.215 The statute provides a special 
motion to strike a SLAPP claim, similar in function to a Rule 12 motion 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, yet the statute was enacted to 
                                                     
209. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion); see also John B. Oakley, 
Illuminating Shady Grove: A General Approach to Solving Erie Problems, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
79, 87 88 (2010) (finding that an approach which measures the substantive right upheld by a state 
procedural rule that is in conflict with a federal rule would undermine the purpose of having universal 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
210. 190 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1999). 
211. Qui tam proceedings are ones brought under a statute which allows a private citizen to sue for 
a recovery, part of which the government receives. Qui Tam Action, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
212. Newsham, 190 F.3d at 963.  
213. Id. at 966; see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(b)(1). 
214. Newsham, 190 F.3d at 967. The court in Newsham entertained the issue of retroactively 
applying an amended version of FCA to issues that arose prior to its amendment. Id. However, this 
Article will solely address the issues pertaining to the anti-SLAPP statute. 
215. Id. at 970 (citing Wilcox v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (1994), disapproved of by 
Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685 (Cal. 2002)). 
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provide enhanced protection of free speech and the right to petition.216 A 
court faced with applying the anti-SLAPP statute looks to the pleadings, 
shifting the burden to the SLAPP plaintiff, who is required to show that 
his or he  claim ha  a ea able babili   e ail.217 Next, the 
court noted that the anti-SLAPP statute provides for an award of 
a e  fee  f ll i g he g a i g f a  a i-SLAPP motion.218 The 
c  i dica ed ha  he Calif ia legi la e looked for procedural and 
substantive remedies for the prompt exposure, dismissal, and 
di c ageme  f SLAPP i . 219 
In addition, the court discussed procedurally how the district court had 
handled the counterclaims, first dismissing them in 1991 under the qui 
tam statute, but subsequently reinstating them in 1994.220 Upon 
reinstatement and subsequent motions by plaintiffs for dismissal under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the anti-SLAPP statute, the 
district court found that the statute conflicted with the procedural authority 
of Rule 8, Rule 12(f), and Rule 56 and denied the recovery of 
a e  fees.221 
I  c a   he di ic  c  deci i , he Ni h Ci c i  i  Newsham 
disagreed with the contention that the anti-SLAPP provision would 
directly collide with Rules 8, 12, and 56.222 The court considered two 
sections of the anti-SLAPP statute: the motion to strike and the provision 
f  a a di g a e  fee .223 Reflecting on both the dichotomy of 
substantive and procedural law and Erie  test for state law applicability 
i  fede al c , K i ki decla ed ha  he di i c i  be ee  b a ce 
and procedure is not always clear-c . 224 In his view, many close cases 
                                                     
216. Id. at 971 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 1999)). 
217. Id. (first citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e); and then citing Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
452). 
218. Id. (first citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c); and then citing Robertson v. Rodriguez, 
42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (1995)). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 972. 
221. Id.  
222. Id. (first citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); and then citing Olympic 
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
223. Id. 
224. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 272 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) 
(first citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010); and then 
citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996)). But see Gaber, supra note 163, at 
993 (a g i g ha  i  i  alm  im ible  c cei e f a a e la  ha  ld e e  be f d  be 
fficie l  i e e  i h he a e  defi i i  f b a i e igh , e  a  he ame ime 
di a il  ced al  i  f m ch ha  a c  ld ever reach the need to apply [J ice S e e  
test in Shady Grove] i  he fi  lace  (em ha i  i  igi al)).  
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call f  a m e a ced a al i . 225 For example, Kozinski noted, 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. addressed a conflict between an Oklahoma 
statute of limitation requirement that a civil action began when a summons 
was served on a defendant and the Rule 3 requirement that a civil suit 
begins when a complaint is filed.226 There, the Supreme Court held that 
he  le  c ld c e i  eaceabl  i  hei  e ec i e he e ,  i ce 
he a e le deal  i h fi di g if he ac i  a  b gh  i hi  he 
a e f limi a i ,  hile Rule 3 mea ed he ime a licable  he 
li iga i . 227 Unlike Walker, where the conflict was between a state 
substantive law and a federal procedural one, Kozinski concluded that the 
California anti-SLAPP statute was a procedural rule without a basis for 
application in federal court.228 
The mistake of Newsham, according to Kozinski, was that the court 
erred in finding that the rule was substantive and then analyzing the 
potential conflict it had with the federal rules, when the statute was simply 
procedural.229 I  a ic la , he a e  ecial m i   ike i dica ed 
ha  he a e deal[ ] l  i h he c d c  f he la i . 230 Applying 
Erie, K i ki a e  ha  he di c i  begi  a d e d  i h C g e s 
intent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applied in federal 
court.231 Kozinski states that Newsham  li g di ed he delica e 
process envisioned by the federal rule drafters since it included a myriad 
of contrary procedures far outside of the confines of the federal procedural 
rules.232 The concurrence continuously notes that where a party gets past 
the preliminary phase, the federal rules permit dismissal only after a fair 
period of discovery.233 But the anti-SLAPP statute overrides this 
                                                     
225. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 272 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
226. Id. at 272 73 (citing Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 51).  
227. Id. at 273. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. ( The a i-SLAPP statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a special 
ced al mecha i m f  i dica i g e i i g igh . ); see also Carbone v. Cable News Network, 
Inc., No. 1:16-CV-1720-ODE, 2017 WL 5244176, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2017) (quoting Makaeff, 
715 F.3d at 275 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring)).  
230. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 273 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) ( [I] s only purpose is the swift 
termination of certain lawsuits the legislators believed to be unduly burdensome. It is codified in the 
a e c de f ci il ced e a d he Calif ia S eme C  ha  cha ac e i ed i  a  a ced al 
device to screen out me i le  claim .  ( i g Kible  . N. I  C . L c. Hosp. Dist., 138 P.3d 
193, 198 (Cal. 2006))).  
231. Id. (first citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); and then citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072). 
232. Id. at 274 (first citing Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994); 
and then citing Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009)). 
233. Id. (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 29 37, 56; then citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
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procedural requirement through an early discovery system.234 
T i g  he Ni h Ci c i  ruling in Metabolife International, Inc. 
v. Wornick235 that he a e  ecified di c e  i  did  a l  
in federal court, Kozinski declared that the anti-SLAPP statute was now 
neutered.236 Since the defendant invoking the statute no longer had the 
ick a d ai le  e i  f m he li iga i  ef ll  g a ed b  he 
legislators enacting the statute, Kozinski argued that both of the purposes 
of the federal rules and the statute were frustrated.237 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit revisited this issue in Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America v. Center for Medical Progress.238 In both Metabolife 
and Makaeff, discussed earlier, the court had noted that the analysis of whether 
the California anti-SLAPP statute should be applied in federal court had been 
inconsistent, in that portions of the statute had been held to apply while other 
portions did not.239 In Planned Parenthood, the court sought to clarify the 
standards applicable to state law anti-SLAPP motions in federal court, rather 
than simply overrule Newsham.240 In Planned Parenthood, the plaintiff alleged 
ha  he defe da  had ed f a d le  mea   e e  he lai iff  
confe e ce  a d b ai  mee i g  i h he ga i a i  aff  c ea e fal e 
and misleading videos.241 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a special motion to strike 
the complaint under California  a i-SLAPP statute, section 425.16 of the 
                                                     
U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986); and then citing 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2740 (3d ed. 2012)).  
234. Id.; see also Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 719 20 (5th Cir. 2016) (Graves, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that the Texas anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with Federal Rules 12 and 56 because of 
their enhanced discovery procedures). 
235. 264 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001). 
236. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 274 75 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (citing Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 845). 
237. Id. a  275 ( F m he fede al e ec i e, Metabolife left in place quite a bit of disruption: the 
burden on the plaintiffs to show that they have not merely a triable issue of fact, but a reasonable 
probability of success; enhanced sanctions for bringing a weak claim; and the cost, disruption and 
delay inherent in a right to interlocutory appeal created by state law, rather than by Congress. I find 
it passing strange that state legislatures have now displaced Congress as the delimiters of our 
j i dic i . ); see also Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1045 46 
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, 88th 
Cong. 153 (1946), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV03-1946-min-Vol1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5WPN-ZDKF]) ( [S] a eme  b  Ad i  C mmi ee Chai ma  William D. 
Mitchell: mandatory language in Rule 12(d) a  i e ed i  he ame dme  beca e e d  a  
a j dge decidi g a ca e  affida i  he  ha  i  R le 56. ), aff d, 791 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015). 
238. 890 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2018). 
239. Id. at 833 35 (majority opinion); id. at 835 36 (Gould, J., concurring). 
240. Id. at 832 35 (majority opinion). 
241. Id. at 831. 
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California Code of Civil Procedure.242 According to the state statute, where 
a defendant can show that the lawsuit targets protected activity, the plaintiff 
m  h  a ea able babili  f e aili g  its claims.243 Defendants 
can attack either the legal sufficiency of the complaint or present evidence 
demonstrating why the plaintiff cannot prevail.244 
In Planned Parenthood, he di ic  c  de ied he defe da  
anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that because the arguments made by the 
defendants under Rule 12 were identical to those made in the anti-SLAPP 
m i , he c  l  eeded  a e  he fficie c  f he lai iff  
complaint under Rule 12.245 When the defendants then supported their 
motion by raising factual defenses, the court held that the questions of fact 
precluded dismissal.246  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision below and clarified 
the applicable standards for anti-SLAPP motions in federal courts, 
holding that where an anti-SLAPP motion attacks the legal sufficiency of 
he lai iff  c m lai , a c  i   e al a e he m i  i g he 
standard under Rule 12 and Rule 8.247 On the other hand, according to the 
c , he e a defe da  m i  a ack  he factual sufficiency of the 
claim, he  he m i  m  be ea ed a  h gh i  e e a m i  f  
mma  j dgme  a d di c e  m  be e mi ed. 248 The court 
indicated that given the a a e  i c i e cie  be ee  Calif ia  a i-
SLAPP statute and the federal rules, a c a  eadi g ld lead  he 
stark collision of the state rules of procedure with the governing Federal 
R le . 249 The cour  ejec ed he defe da  a g me  ha  he e a i  
of the state anti-SLAPP statute requires a plaintiff to present evidence, 
h ldi g ha  if he defe da  ha e ged l  i fficie c  f leadi g , 
then the plaintiff can properly respond merely by showing sufficiency of 
leadi g , a d he e   e i eme  f  a lai iff  bmi  e ide ce  
oppose contrary evidence tha  a  e e  e e ed b  he defe da . 250  
Two judges, Judge Gould and Judge Murguia, joined in a separate 
concurrence addressing the larger issue of the use of anti-SLAPP statutes 
in federal court and the basis for an interlocutory appeal under the 
                                                     
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 833. 
244. Id. at 833 34. 
245. Id. at 832. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 833. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 834. 
250. Id. 
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collateral order doctrine.251 In their view, denial of an anti-SLAPP motion 
does not qualify as a collateral order because instead of resolving claims 
e a a e f m he me i , i  i  fac  e i e  he c   di ec l  a e  he 
me i  f Plai iff  c m lai . 252 In their concurrence, Gould and 
Murguia did not explicitly encourage the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its 
prior decision in Newsham applying anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court, 
b  he j dge  did e ha  e f he ima  d i e  f  all i g hi  
practice to continue prevention of a circuit split has occurred despite 
 be  eff . 253  
2. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
The First Circuit addressed Shady Grove  im ac   SLAPP a e  
in federal courts in Godin v. Schencks.254 Rel i g  S e e s 
concurrence, the court followed the procedural mechanisms of a state 
SLAPP statute.255 In Godin, the First Circuit followed the logic of the 
Ninth Circuit in Newsham.256 The court agreed with the finding of the 
Ninth Circuit that rather than concluding that Rules 12 and 56 are in 
conflict with a state anti-SLAPP, a court could find that Rules 12 and 56 
ca  e i  ide b  ide  i h a a e a i-SLAPP a e, each c lling 
i   i e ded he e f c e age i h  c flic . 257 
Godin concerned an action by an elementary school principal who 
made a § 1983 claim after being fired as a result of complaints that she 
was abusive towards her students.258 After investigating the lai iff  
conduct, the school terminated her employment contract prematurely, 
which prompted her lawsuit.259 In addition to her § 1983 claim, she 
asserted claims for defamation and interference with contractual 
                                                     
251. Id. at 835 (Gould, J., concurring). 
252. Id. at 836. 
253. Id. On November 21, 2018, the Center for Medical Progress filed a petition for certiorari, 
asking the Supreme Court to resolve the split between the Circuit Courts of Appeals on the issue of 
whether state anti-SLAPP statutes should apply in a federal court sitting in diversity. Petition for Writ 
f Ce i a i, C . F  Med. P g e  . Pla ed Pa e h d Fed  f Am., __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 
1446 (2019) (No. 18-696). On April 1, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case, thus 
again leaving the current circuit split in place. Ctr. For Med. Progress, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1446 
(2019). 
254. 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010). 
255. Id. at 87 88. 
256. Id. at 91.  
257. Id. at 89 91 (citing United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 
F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
258. Id. at 80 81. 
259. Id. at 81. 
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relationships against individual defendants in the suit.260 In response, the 
individual defendants filed a special motion to dismiss the individual 
claim  de  Mai e  a i-SLAPP a e, hich he c  ed, c ea e  
a special process by which a defendant may move to dismiss any claim 
that arises f m he defe da  e e ci e f he igh  f e i i  de  
ei he  he U i ed S a e  C i i   he C i i  f Mai e. 261 The 
First Circuit then elaborated on the procedural structure of the statute, 
where after the moving party files their statutory claim, the burden shifts 
to the non-moving party to show that the moving party caused the non-
m i g a  i j , a d ha  he m i g a  m i  ha   
ea able fac al   a  a g able ba i  i  la . 262 
Notably, a court analyzing the statutory claim views the evidence in 
favor of the moving party.263 The district court denied the motion much 
like the district court in Newsham, concluding that the statute at hand 
directly contradicted the federal rules.264 Furthermore, the district court 
found support for this conclusion by first noting that the district courts in 
Massachusetts had also concluded that the special motions to dismiss did 
not apply in federal court.265 While the district court acknowledged that 
compelling arguments can be made both ways as to whether the statutes 
applied in federal court, it noted two ways in which the statute conflicted 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.266 First, the special motion to 
dismiss triggers a burden shift. Second, when reviewing the special 
motion to dismiss, the court does not make inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party.267 The district court concluded that the operation of 
Rule 12(d) was at odds with the statutory requirement, in that it forced 
he c   f eef m ead a d eigh he c flic ing declarations, 
something a federal court would not do in the context of ruling on a 
motion to dismiss a state law interference with advantageous relations or 
                                                     
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 82 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (West 2009)). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. ( E ide ce c ide ed i  e ie i g a ecial m i   di mi  h ld be ie ed i  he 
light most favorable to the moving party because the responding party bears the burden of proof when 
the a e a lie .  ( i g M e B ., I c. . Web e , 2001 ME 70,  18, 772 A.2d 842, 849)). 
264. Id. 
265. Godin v. Sch. Union 134, No. 09-77-B-W, 2009 WL 1686910, at *4 (D. Me. June 16, 2009) 
( To the extent that the anti-SLAPP statute imposes additional procedures in certain kinds of litigation 
in state court, it does not trump Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  ( i g Bake  . C e, 940 F. Supp. 409, 
417 (D. Mass. 1996))). 
266. Id. at *5. 
267. Id.  
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defama i  claim. 268 In essence, the district court found that the 
requirement under the anti-SLAPP statute that the court consider evidence 
outside of the pleadings conflicted with Rule 12, while the requirement of 
making inferences in favor of the moving party conflicted with Rule 56.269 
After reviewing the actions of the district court, the First Circuit 
addressed some preliminary issues of subject matter jurisdiction and the 
collateral order doctrine, which are not the focus of this paper.270 Turning 
to the issue of the anti-SLAPP a e  a licabili  i  fede al c , he 
court began by noting that the lines between substantive law and 
ced al la  a e f e  diffic l   di i g i h. 271 Framing the issue as 
he he  Fede al R le  f Ci il P ced e 12(b)(6) and 56 preclude 
application of Section 556 i  fede al c ,  he c , ci i g Shady Grove, 
declared that the question of applicability in federal court requires the 
c   a k if he fede al le i  fficie l  b ad  c l he i e 
bef e he c . 272 If s , he fede al le ill be gi e  effec  de i e 
he e i e ce f c m e i g a e la . 273 The court concluded that Federal 
Rules 12 and 56 do not control the issues contemplated under section 556 
of the Maine statute.274 Further, the court concluded that the twin aims of 
Erie avoiding forum shopping and the unequal administration of the 
law are better met by enforcing the statute in federal court.275 
In discussing Shady Grove, the First Circuit relied upon Justice 
S e e s c c e ce a i g ha  he he  a Federal Rule is valid under 
the Rules Enabling Act depends not on the Federal Rule alone, but also 
 he a e f he a e le i  eek   di lace. 276 For the court, this 
meant that because the lines between procedure and substance are, at 
times, indistinguishable, state substantive rights are to be handled 
delicately when found embedded in a state procedural mechanism that 
mirrors a federal rule; and all attempts to reconcile the two must be 
                                                     
268. Id. ( [U] de  Fede al R le f Ci il P ced e 12(b)(6), we recount the facts alleged in the 
ame ded c m lai  a d d a  all la ible i fe e ce  i  fa  f he [ lai iff/]a ella .  ( i g 
Gonzalez Figueroa v. J.C. Penney P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 2009))).  
269. Id.   
270. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 83 84 (1st Cir. 2010). 
271. Id. at 86 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 419 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
272. Id. (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
273. Id. at 86 n.12 (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a); and then citing McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 
950 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1991)). 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 86 87 (first citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); and then citing Shady 
Grove, 559 U.S. at 398). 
276. Id. at 87 (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 24 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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followed.277 The court determined that Rules 12(b)(6) a d 56 are not so 
broad as to cover the issues within the scope of Section 556. 278 First, the 
court showed that section 556 was designed to handle the special 
procedure of eliminating SLAPP suits, whereas Rules 12 and 56 are for 
general dismissals.279 The e i e ce f b h Mai e   
ced al . . . e i ale  f R le  12 and 56 as well a  he a e  
intent to defend constitutional petitioning rights served as the First 
Ci c i  e ide ce f he a e  broad scope.280 
I  he c  ie , R le 12(b)(6) e  he fficie c  f he 
c m lai , 281 while section 556 di mi e  d e  he i f i geme  f he 
defe da  ec ed e i i i g c d c . 282 Comparably, the court 
found Rule 56 lacked he fac -fi de  e al a i  f ma e ial fac al 
dispu e  e ed b  he a e.283 The First Circuit determined that the 
shifting burden of proof to the alleged SLAPP filer was substantive in 
a e, al g i h he all ca i  f a e  fee .284 The court 
ack ledged he diffe e ce  i  he mecha ic  between section 556 
and the federal rules, but determined that section 556 defines the scope of 
a state-created right to freely petition.285 To hold otherwise would violate 
he REA b  al e i g a b a i e igh , i  he Fi  Ci c i  e e .286 In 
reply to the lai iff  c e i  ha  section 556 forces a ruling without 
taking discovery, unlike Rule 56, the court held that discovery could, in 
fact, be heard upon a good cause order.287 The court concluded that the 
burden placed on a nonmovant under Rule 56(d) to show essential facts 
to justify its opposition is synonymous with the Maine statute.288 
The court further held that the existence of the Private Securities 
                                                     
277. Id. at 87 88 (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
278. Id. at 88.  
279. Id. 
280. Id. (citing ME. R. CIV. P. 12, 56). 
281. Id. at 89 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)). 
282. Id.  
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 89 n.15 (citing Servicios Comerciales Andinos, S.A. v. Gen. Elec. Del Caribe, Inc., 145 
F.3d 463, 478 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
285. Id. at 89 90 ( Beca e Sec i  556 i   i e i ed i h a a e igh   emed  ha  i  
functions to define the scope of the state-c ea ed igh ,  i  ca  be displaced by Rule 12(b)(6) or 
Rule 56.  ( i g Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring))); see also, e.g., Quinlan, supra note 40, at 401 02 (arguing that most 
of the procedural components of anti-SLAPP statutes are, in fact, substantive).  
286. Godin, 629 F.3d at 90. 
287. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (West 2009)). 
288. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)).  
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Litigation Reform Act of 1995,289 which created a higher standard of 
pleading in order to deter abusive litigation in the world of securities, 
e e  a  e ide ce ha  C g e  did  i e d  ecl de ecial le  
designed to make it more difficult to bring certain types of actions where 
a e la  defi e  he ca e f ac i . 290 Ultimately, the First Circuit 
concluded that to not apply section 556 in federal court would dismantle 
the twin aims of Erie to discourage forum shopping and an inequitable 
administration of the laws.291 I  he c  i i ,  de  a lica i  
of the statute in federal court would unfairly sway the outcome of the case 
in such a manner that it would be grossly different from the result in a 
Maine state court applying the statute.292 Likewise, to not apply 
section 556 would allow SLAPP filers to file in federal court in order to 
avoid he a e  bi e al ge he .293 
B. Circuits Not Applying Anti-SLAPP Motions in Federal Court 
1. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit stand in stark opposition to 
some of their sister circuits. In Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC,294 
the D.C. Circuit held that Rules 12 and 56 were to be applied over a D.C. 
anti-SLAPP statute.295 Plaintiff Yasser Abbas sued the Foreign Policy 
Group for defamation over magazine commentary suggesting that 
plaintiff and his brother, sons of the Palestinian president, were profiting 
off of corruption at the expense of Palestinian citizens.296 The defendants 
moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as well as the anti-SLAPP 
                                                     
289. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
290. Godin, 629 F.3d a  91 ( [T]he e i   i dica i  ha  R le  . . . 12 and 56 were intended to 
cc  he field  i h e ec   e ial ced e  aimed a  eedi g  me i le  claim .  ( i g 
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 
1999))). But see Abba  . F eig  P l  Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
( C g e  deci i   e ac  a heigh e ed leadi g a da d f  a mall b e  f [ ec i ie ] ca e  
does not change the fact that Rules 12 a d 56 he i e a l  ge e all .  ( i g Shady Grove, 
559 U.S. at 400)).  
291. Godin, 629 F.3d at 91 (quoting Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Walsbrook Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 764, 773 
(1st Cir. 1994)). 
292. Id. at 91 92. 
293. Id. at 92.  
294. 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
295. Id. at 1337.  
296. Abbas v. F eig  P l  G ., LLC, 975 F. S . 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013) ( ema ki g ha  Abba  
ha  filed  h ea e ed  file defama i  i  [a]  blic c i  e  hi  b i e  a d political 
ac i i  ha  i c ea ed ). 
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statute.297 The D.C. District Court began with a similar analysis to the 
courts in Newsham and Godin, analyzing the purpose for which the D.C. 
legislature enacted the statute, concluding that it was enacted to serve as 
a weapon against those who seek to disrupt free speech through 
unnecessary litigation.298 The di ic  c  ech ed he c  a i ale i  
Godin, holding that Rules 12 a d 56 e e  b ad e gh  c l 
the particular issues under [the anti-SLAPP statute] before the district 
c . 299 Furthermore, the district court cited to its own decisions which 
had held he a licabili  f a e A i-SLAPP legislation in 
federal c . 300 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion written by then-Judge 
Kavanaugh, began by acknowledging the free speech interest that the 
statute was designed to protect, noting that a defendant may file a special 
m i   di mi  if he defe da  ca  make a ima facie h i g ha  
the claim at issue arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy 
 i e  f blic i e e . 301 Kavanaugh stated that under Shady Grove, 
a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction would not apply the statute 
since it answers the same question as Federal Rules 12 and 56, yet the 
a e addi i all  e i e  ha  he lai iff h  a likelih d f 
cce   he me i . 302 Acc di g  he c , he a e e   a  
addi i al h dle a lai iff m  j m  e   ge   ial,  hich 
contrasts with the standard for granting a 12(b)(6) motion under Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly303 a lai iff m  alleg[e] fac  fficie   
a e a claim ha  i  la ible  i  face. 304 Next, Kavanaugh interrogated 
                                                     
297. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333. 
298. Abbas, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 8 9 (quoting D.C. CODE § 16-5502(a) (b) (2001)).  
299. Id. at 10 (quoting Godin, 629 F.3d at 86).  
300. Id. (first citing Boley v. Atl. Monthly Grp., 950 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 55 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(explaining that the D.C. District Court would follow the rationale of the circuit courts in Godin and 
Newsham); then citing Farah v. Esquire Mag., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 29, 38 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding 
ha  bl g  a i i i g bi he  m eme  a  a  e e i  f a ie  fficie   e c m a  
public interest, so it was protected as a substantive right); and then citing Sherrod v. Breitbart, 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 83, 85 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that legislative commentary indicated that the D.C. anti-
SLAPP Act was designed to incorporate substantive rights into a procedural mechanism for disposing 
of SLAPPs)). But see 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 102 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the 
D.C. anti-SLAPP Ac  a el  a em   a e  he ame e i  ha  R le  12 and 56 cover and, 
he ef e, ca  be a lied i  a fede al c  i i g i  di e i ). 
301. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1332 (quoting D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b) (2001)). 
302. Id. at 1333 34 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 398 99 (2010)). 
303. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
304. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Unity 
Healthcare, Inc. v. City of Hennepin, 308 F.R.D. 537, 540 42 (D. Mi . 2015) ( i g Mi e a  
anti-SLAPP statute conflicts directly with Federal Rules 12 and 56 and abrogates the Seventh 
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f  f he defe da  a g me  f  h  he a e m  be a lied.305 
First, the court found that where the statute imposed a higher bar for 
success than the federal rule it mirrors, the application of the statute stood 
in stark opposition to the purpose of the federal rules.306 In reply to the 
defe da  a g me  ha  he a e gi e  a b a i e igh   f d 
in the Federal Rules a form of qualified immunity shielding participants 
i  blic deba e f m  liabili ,  he c  a ed that qualified 
immunity alone does not tell the court what to do procedurally, as is the 
case with the D.C. statute.307 As in Godin, the defendant articulated that 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 modified the 
pleading standards applicable in certain categories of securities cases.308 
The court found that this is distinct, because Congress has the power to 
create an exception to the federal rules for these limited cases, which are 
irrelevant to the general application of the federal rules in civil suits.309 
Finally, the court outright rejected the decisions in Godin and Newsham 
a  l ima el   e a i e. 310 The court stated that unless it were 
shown that the rules were unconstitutional or violated the REA in some 
way, they would govern diversity cases in federal court.311 Since Hanna, 
this question has been at the core of analysis determining the application 
of federal rules in federal court where a conflict with a state rule or 
practice exists.312 
In conclusion, the court then followed the plurality opinion of Shady 
Grove and determined that because Rules 12 a d 56 eall  eg la e[] 
ced e,  he  a e alid de  he REA.313 Ultimately, the court found 
ha  Abba s claim failed to meet the requirement under 12(b)(6) and must 
be dismissed with prejudice.314 
                                                     
Amendment right to a jury trial). 
305. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334 36. 
306. Id. at 1334 35. 
307. Id. at 1335 (citing Doe No. 1 v. Burke, 91 A.3d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014)). 
308. Id. (citing Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737). 
309. Id. (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 
(2010)). 
310. Id. at 1335 36 (first citing Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81, 92 (1st Cir. 2010); then citing 
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999); 
and then citing Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring)). 
311. Id. at 1336 37, 1336 n.4. 
312. Id. at 1336 37. 
313. Id. at 1337 (citing Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 404). 
314. Id. at 1339 40. 
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2. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit concluded in Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. 
AmeriCulture, Inc.315 that a New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute was not 
applicable in federal court.316 In a claim for breach of contract concerning 
a  ag eeme   ma age he a ie  c i i g a d c -existing use of a 
shared geothermal resource on federally leased land, the defendants 
brought a special motion to dismiss under the state statute.317 The 
defendants asserted that the statute was designed to protect the substantive 
right of New Mexicans to be able to speak freely without the chilling 
effect of litigious suits designed to stifle their participation.318 The district 
c  m l  ejec ed he defe da  i e e a i  f he aim  f Shady 
Grove, noting that a federal court sitting in diversity will not apply a state 
law or rule when a federal rule answers the same question as the rule and 
does not violate the REA.319 
The district court looked to the decisions of Godin and Newsham, but 
f d hem a i g, e eciall  d e  J dge K i ki  la e  
interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statute in Makaeff.320 In particular, the 
court emphasized the reasoning of the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, which found that the anti-SLAPP special motion to 
di mi  ele a ed a lai iff  b de  be d ha  mall  e i ed b  a 
motion under Rules 12 or 56.321 The district court followed the reasoning 
of the plurality opinion in Shady Grove, concluding that 
[s]traightforward application of the two-prong Shady Grove analysis 
                                                     
315. 885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018). 
316. Id. at 673. 
317. Id. at 661 62. 
318. Id. at 662 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN § 38-2-9.1 (West 
2019)). 
319. Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. AmeriCulture, Inc., No. 15-CV-0547-MV-LAM, 2016 
WL 8254920, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 17, 2016) (quoting Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334). 
320. Id. at *3 ( Fede al c  ha e  b i e  a l i g e ic a e ced al le  hich, f 
necessity, disrupt the comprehensive scheme embodied in the Federal Rules, our jurisdictional 
a e  a d S eme C  i e e a i  he e f.  ( i g Makaeff . T ump Univ., LLC, 715 
F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring))).  
321. Id. a  *3 ( A l i g he Shady Grove f ame k, he c  ca ef ll  e lai ed ha  b  
placing a higher procedural burden on the plaintiff than is required to survive a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56, Section 525 conflicts with Rule 12(d) and Rule 56 b  e ic i g a lai iff  
procedural right to maintain [an action] established by the federal rules and therefore cannot be 
a lied b  a fede al c  i i g i  di e i .  ( i g I e c  S l ., I c. . Ba el Ac i  Ne k, 
969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 2013))); see also Lampo Grp., LLC v. Paffrath, No. 18-cv-
01402, 2019 WL 3305143, at *3 4 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2019) (applying California law) (noting that 
Calif ia  a i-SLAPP statute conflicted with Federal Rules 12 and 56 and that these federal rules 
did not conflict with the Rules Enabling Act). 
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make  a e  ha  he Fede al R le  f Ci il P ced e,  Ne  Me ic  
anti-SLAPP a e, g e  he i a  ca e. 322 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit restated the Erie requirement that federal 
c  a l[ ] a e b a i e la those rights and remedies that bear 
upon the outcome of the suit and federal procedural law the processes 
 m de  f  e f ci g h e b a i e igh  a d emedie . 323 Noting, 
as the D.C. Circuit did, that the line between substantive and procedural 
law is blurry, the c  c cl ded ha  he a e  la g age e ealed i  a  
me el  a procedural mechanism designed to expedite the disposal of 
f i l  la i  aimed a  h ea e i g f ee eech igh . 324 The court 
found evidence for this conclusion in the text of the statute itself, noting 
ha  [a]ll [ he a e] dema d  i  e edi ed ced e  de ig ed  
m l  ide if  a d di e f ch la i  a d ha  he a e e  
f h  le( ) f b a i e la . 325 
To further support the proposition that the anti-SLAPP statute is a 
procedural mechanism, the court cited Cordova v. Cline,326 a case where 
the New Mexico Supreme Court specifically declared that the New 
Mexico anti-SLAPP statute afforded a procedural shield.327 The New 
Mexico Supreme Court in Cordova distinguished the substantive 
protections the parties would seek from the procedural mechanism of the 
statute.328 Despite acknowledging that the statute might defend 
b a i e igh , he Te h Ci c i  held ha  he e igh  a e l ca ed 
entirely outside the four corners of the anti-SLAPP a e. 329 In essence, 
he c  f d ha   i dica i  f a le f b a i e la  a   be 
discerned in the language of the statute. Rather, the statute featured a 
ec i  ha  e a ed a  a ced al fee-shifting device . . . to vindicate 
First Amendment igh  h ea e ed b  a ki d f a a ed  eci  
                                                     
322. Los Lobos, 2016 WL 8254920, at *4. 
323. Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. AmeriCulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 668 (10th Cir. 2018) 
(citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
324. Id. at 668 69.  
325. Id. at 669.  
326. 396 P.3d 159, 162 (N.M. 2017).  
327. Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 669 ( The a e eme c  held he a cia i  membe  e e 
e i led  he procedural protections of the New Mexico [anti-SLAPP] a e.  B   e l e he 
case on the merits, the court relied on a substantive immunity defense entirely separate from the anti-
SLAPP a e.  (em ha i  i  igi al) ( i g Cordova, 396 P.3d at 162)).  
328. Cordova, 396 P.3d at 166 67 ( While he [a] i-SLAPP statute provides the procedural 
protections Petitioners require, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is the mechanism that offers Petitioners 
he b a i e Fi  Ame dme  ec i  he  eek.  (em ha i  i  igi al)). 
329. Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 670 (first citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); and 
then citing Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 719 (5th Cir. 2016) (Graves, J., dissenting)). 
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li iga i . 330 N abl , he c  f d ha  he a e ide  f  a  
e edi ed a eal  f m a ial c  li g,  fail e  le,  a 
ecial  m i . 331 
Further citing Cordova, the court stated that the New Mexico Supreme 
C  did  gge  he e edi ed ce  ma da ed b  b ec i  A 
of § 38-2-9.1 c i e  a b a i e defe e  a SLAPP i  b  a he  
eflec ed he Ne  Me ic  legi la e  de i e  all  f  a ki d f 
inte l c  a eal  h a  e alia  la i  ha  ab ed he j dicial 
ce  a d h ea e ed  chill f ee eech. 332 The court concluded that 
he defe da  i i e ce ha  he a e ffe  a  imm i  f m i  
was misguided.333 The court briefly discussed the twin aims of Erie, 
concluding that ignoring the statute would not be outcome determinative 
nor eclipse a state substantive right.334 The court, however, offered a 
warning that despite the statute not being applied in federal court, 
li iga  a d lawyers who seek to circumvent application of the New 
Mexico anti-SLAPP statute by filing a baseless SLAPP lawsuit in federal 
di ic  c  a e i  f  a de a ake i g. 335 
3. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar approach to the Tenth Circuit 
in Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc. (CNN),336 where it held that 
Ge gia  a i-SLAPP statute did not apply in federal court.337 The 
                                                     
330. Id. at 671 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (West 2019)).  
331. Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(C) (West 2019)).  
332. Id. at 671 72 (citing Cordova, 396 P.3d at 165). 
333. Id. at 672 73. As the court notes: 
As the astute reader recognizes by now, the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute does not exempt a 
party subject to an alleged SLAPP suit from liability. Because absolutely nothing in the language 
of the anti-SLAPP statute exempts from liability under any circumstance one who has violated 
the law while petitioning a governmental body, the statute cannot constitute a grant of immunity. 
The igh    a d ial  i  t, as Defendants suggest, a substantive defense in the form of 
immunity itself. Such right is an entitlement dependent upon an exemption from liability, an 
exemption that under a plain reading of the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute does not appear 
therein. 
Id. at 672. 
334. Id. at 673 n.8 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). 
335. Id. On July 16, 2016, AmeriCulture filed a petition for certiorari, asking the Supreme Court 
to resolve the split between the Circuit Courts of Appeals on the issue of whether state anti-SLAPP 
statutes should apply in a federal court sitting in diversity. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
AmeriCulture, Inc. v. Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 591 (2018) (No. 18-
89). On December 3, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case, thus leaving the current 
circuit split in place. Los Lobos, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 591 (2018).  
336. 910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018). 
337. Id. at 1357. 
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defe da , CNN, gh   e Ge gia  a i-SLAPP laws to strike down 
a complai  agai  i  f  allegedl  defama  e  e  made 
stating that the mortality rate for infants undergoing heart surgery in the 
lai iff  h i al a  highe  ha  he a i al a e age b  i g a fal e 
comparison between the mortality rates of open-heart surgery versus that 
of closed-heart surgery.338 In the alternative, CNN sought to dismiss the 
case under Rule 12(b)(6), giving rise to the choice of law that continues 
to evade courts today.339 
The district court held that neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor the Georgia anti-
SLAPP provision were appropriate. The complaint stated grounds for 
relief under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Georgia anti-SLAPP law conflicted 
with the procedural mechanism of Rule 12(b)(6).340 In particular, the 
district court noted ha  he a e e e iall  c ea e  a R le 12(b)(6) 
l  a da d f  ca e  i h a Fi  Ame dme  e . 341 The district 
court succinctly noted that where Rule 12(b)(6) e i e  la ibili   
he face f he c m lai ,  he Ge gia a e e i es a probability of 
e aili g. 342 The district court noted support for its decision in recent 
i i  f J dge K i ki, hich a  c e   he c  deci i  
in Newsham.343 
O  a eal, he c  bega  i  a al i  b  i g ha  [a] fede al c  
exercising diversity jurisdiction will not apply a state statute if a Federal 
R le f Ci il P ced e a e  he e i  i  di e. 344 The court 
held ha  he e e ial e i  a  he he  lai iff Ca b e  c m lai  
stated a claim for relief, which is accounted for in Rules 8, 12, and 56 
when all are taken together.345 First, the court noted that the standard for 
dismissal under Rules 8 and 12, whether or not the claim on its face was 
la ible,  a  i  c flic  i h he a i-SLAPP requirement.346 The 
                                                     
338. Id. at 1347 48. 
339. Id. at 1348. 
340. Id. 
341. Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 16-CV-1720, 2017 WL 5244176, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 
Feb. 14, 2017).  
342. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 
343. Id. a  *4 ( F he m e, i  ece  ea , J dge K i k i a d e e al f hi  c lleag e  ha e 
challe ged he i d m f he Ni h Ci c i  c i ed le a ce f  a i-SLAPP statutes gives that 
their babili  a da d di ec l  c flic  i h Fede al R le 12, which provides a one-size-fits-
all e  f  e al a i g claim  a  he leadi g age  a   he la ib[ili ]  a da d.  ( i g 
Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hirsh, 831 F.3d 1179, 1183 (2016) (Kozinski, J., concurring))). 
344. Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010)). 
345. Id. at 1350. 
346. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
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Georgia la  a ed ha  he c m lai  m  ide a babili  ha  
the plaintiff shall prevail on their claim.347 Furthermore, the Georgia 
a e  e i eme  f defi i e babili  f cce  a  ial a d he 
evidentiary burden this requirement carried conflicted with the 
comparatively meager standard of Rule 56 requiring that there is a 
genuine, triable issue of fact.348 
Ultimately, the court found that the statute would abrogate the ability 
of the plaintiff to proceed into the discovery stage, which is normally 
granted by satisfying the requirements of Rules 8 and 12.349 By 
c m a i , he a e  e i eme  c ea e  a highe  ba  f  he lai iff 
by imposing a higher evidentiary requirement at an earlier stage in the 
litigation process.350 CNN relied on Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp.,351 a case where the Supreme Court found no conflict between a 
New Jersey statute requiring certain plaintiff shareholders to provide a 
bond for cost security and Federal Rule 23, which required a stockbroker 
to verify as such by oath before continuing with his case.352 However, the 
court distinguished Cohen, noting that the New Jersey statute did not strip 
away any rights created by Rule 23, unlike the situation at hand.353 CNN 
also argued that the Georgia statute existed in a separate sphere of law 
designed to protect free speech and therefore should not be superseded by 
the Federal Rules. But the court concluded that the function of the Federal 
Rules and the statute was too sufficiently similar to allow the statute into 
a diversity action.354 
The c  ejec ed CNN  a g me  ha  he a e me el  defi ed 
state substantive rights. The court instead held that the state statute 
provided an expedited procedural device through which a defendant can 
escape liability due to its heightened standard.355 The Eleventh Circuit 
found the reasoning of the District Court of Columbia persuasive in 
deciding that Rules 12 and 56 asked the same procedural question as the 
anti-SLAPP law, providing a different outcome-determinative
                                                     
347. Id. (quoting GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2018)). 
348. Id. at 1351 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). 
349. Id. at 1353; see also Nixon v. Haag, No. 1:08-cv-00648-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 2026343, at *3
4 (S.D. Ind. July 7, 2009) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 74 (1965)) (finding that federal 
rules of discovery superseded discovery- a i g i  f I dia a  a i-SLAPP statute). 
350. Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1353. 
351. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
352. Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1354 (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. 541). 
353. Id. (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 557). 
354. Id. 
355. Id. at 1355. 
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standard for dismissal.356 Ultimately, the court determined that the only 
way the federal rules would be inadequate in this situation would be if 
he  failed  c m l  i h he REA a d he c g e i al e  e  
the . . . fede al c . 357 The court concluded by noting that the rules in 
question did not contradict the REA nor congressional power vested in 
the courts.358 
4. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
More recently, the Fifth Circuit sailed into the treacherous waters of 
Erie when it decided Klocke v. Watson.359 The case arose from the 
defamation claims against Watson and the University of Texas at 
A li g  b gh  b  Kl cke, a  admi i a  f hi   Th ma s 
estate.360 Allegedly, Watson spread false rumors regarding homophobic 
harassment involving Thomas, leading the University to refuse Thomas 
permission to graduate, all f hich agicall  c cl ded i  Th ma s 
suicide.361 Wa  m ed  di mi  Kl cke  claim  de  he Te a  
Ci i e  Pa ici a i  Ac  (TCPA), a e f [a] i-SLAPP statu e. 362 
The di ic  c  f d Kl cke  fail e  e d[]  he b a ce 
f Wa  m i   be fa al  he claim.363 U de  he di ic  c  
a al i , Kl cke  a g me  ha  he Fif h Ci c i  ha  decli ed  h ld 
that the TCPA applies in fede al c  a   made i  he twenty-one-
day window required by local rules.364 Ultimately, the district court 
g a ed Wa  m i   di mi  a d a a ded c  i h  e e  
                                                     
356. Id. a  1356 ( [A]  a i-SLAPP a e i h a babili  e i eme  e abli he  he 
ci c m a ce  de  hich a c  m  di mi  a lai iff  claim bef e ial namely, when the 
court concludes that the plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success on he me i .  ( i g Abba  
. F eig  P l  G ., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Ci . 2015))).  
357. Id. ( [The Ge gia a i-SLAPP a e] ca  a l  i  di e i  i  le  R le  8, 12, 
and 56 a e l a i e  beca e he  fall be d he c e f he e  delega ed i  he REA  
c g e i al e  e  he e a i  f he fede al c .  ( i g Shad  G e O h edic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010))). 
358. Id. at 1357. But see, e.g., Quinlan, supra note 40, at 403 (citing John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal 
Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 
283, 326 n.279 (2008)) (entertaining the possibility that Congress amend the Rules Enabling Act to 
e em  a e li iga i  ef m f m eem i ,  he eby permitting anti-SLAPP statutes to apply in 
federal court).  
359. 936 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2019). 
360. Id. at 242. 
361. Id. at 243. 
362. Id. at 242 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001 .011 (West 2019)). 
363. Klocke v. Univ. of Tex., No. 4:17-CV-285-A, 2017 WL 6767393, at *1 2 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 
2017).  
364. Id.  
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ac all  add e i g Kl cke  a g me  ha  he a i-SLAPP motion did 
not apply in federal court.365 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, while 
ack ledgi g ha  i  had e i l  a ed e e al ime   decidi g 
he he ,   ha  e e , he TCPA a lie  i  fede al c ,  l ima el  
decided that the statute would not apply in federal court.366 
Fi , he c  de c ibed he a e  b de - hif i g f ame k,  
e l i g i  he di mi al f claim  le  h [ ] b  a e de a ce 
f he e ide ce  ha  he ac i  i  ba ed  he m a  e e ci e f he 
li ed igh . 367 Assessing the statute, the court agreed with the D.C. 
Ci c i  ha  [a] fede al c  e e ci i g di e i  j i dic i  h ld  
a l  a a e la   le if (1) a Fede al R le f Ci il P ced e a e [ ] 
he ame e i  a  he a e la   le a d (2) he Fede al Rule does 
 i la e he [REA]. 368 The c  f d ha , i  a ic la , R le  12 
and 56, which govern dismissal and summary judgment motions, 
respectively, answer the same question as the anti-SLAPP statute: what 
are the circumstances under which a court must dismiss a case before 
ial? 369 Finding the TCPA to be analogous to the D.C. anti-SLAPP 
a e, he Fif h Ci c i  decided ha  he TCPA e    high f a  
addi i al h dle a lai iff m  j m  e   ge   ial. 370 
The court reflected on the analysis of Shady Grove, indicating that 
he e a a e a e a e ed he ame e i  . . . but the state 
[statute] imposed additional requirements that [the Federal Rules] did 
,  he a e a e ill  a l .371 The court explained that stating the 
statutes answer the same question  mea  ha  b h a e  ecif[ ] 
e i eme  f  a ca e  ceed a  he ame age f li iga i . 372 The 
court concluded that Rule 12 only requires a court to dismiss a case where, 
accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, the complaint does 
                                                     
365. Id. Compare id., with Sw. Airlines Co. v. Roundpipe, LLC, 375 F. Supp. 3d 687, 700 01 
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2019) (citing Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 719 20 (5th Cir. 2016) (Graves, J., 
dissenting)) (deciding that an anti-SLAPP motion did not apply in federal court where it directly 
conflicted with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56).  
366. Klocke, 936 F.3d at 244 49.  
366. Id. at 244 (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(a)).  
367. Id. (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 27.005 .009).  
368. Id. a  245 ( i g Abba  . F eig  P l  G p., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
369. Id. (quoting Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333 34). 
370. Id. (quoting Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334); Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(a l i g Ne ada  a i-SLAPP statute in federal court because of its substantive protections); United 
States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999).  
371. Klocke, 936 F.3d at 245 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
559 U.S. 393 (2010)). 
372. Id.  
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 a e a la ible claim f  elief. 373 As for Rule 56, the Fifth Circuit 
c e d  ha  [ ]he a  e i i g mma  j dgme  cceed  im l  
by showing that a material fact issue exists and requires trial by 
a fac fi de . 374 
O  he he  ha d, he TCPA  a da d di ec l  c flic  i h he 
fede al le  he e he c  m  de e mi e b  a e de a ce f he 
e ide ce  he he  he ac i  ela e   a a  e e ci e f Fi  
Ame dme  igh . 375 N abl , a lai iff m  h  clea  a d ecific 
e ide ce  a   each eleme  f hi  claim,  hich m  be 
ambig , e,  f ee f m d b . 376 Fi all , he c  m  
de e mi e b  a e de a ce f he e ide ce  if he defe dant can 
e abli h a alid defe e  he lai iff  claim,  hich he c  
determined ultimately put the statute in direct conflict with the 
federal rules.377 
The c  e  add e ed Wa  c e a g me  ha  a lai iff[ s 
requirement to] show probable cce  d e   eek  di lace he 
Federal Rules or have Rules 12(b)(6) a d 56 cea e  f c i , 378 and 
ha  he fede al le  im e l  mi im m ced al e i eme  a d 
a e le  ma  b ild  hem. 379 Recognizing a similar provision in 
the TCPA, he c  f d Wa  a g me  a aili g he e he e  
of whether a conflict between the Federal Rules and a state statute exists 
is not whether it is logically possible for a court to comply with the 
requirements of both, but whether the Federal Rules in question are 
fficie l  b ad  c l he i e bef e he c . 380 Next, where 
he R le  ide a c m ehe i e f ame k g e i g e ial 
di mi al a d j dgme ,  he c  f d  m f  a  he  de ice 
for determining whether a valid claim supported by sufficient evidence 
[ ill] a id e ial di mi al. 381 The court further emphasized the 
practical difficulties that the district court faced when it applied the TCPA 
                                                     
373. Id. at 246 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 79 (2009)).  
374. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)).  
375. Id. at 245 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(b)(1) (3) (West 2019)). 
376. Id. at 246 (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c)); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 
2015)).  
377. Id. at 246 (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(d)). 
378. Id. (quoting Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010)). 
379. Id. at 247. 
380. Id. at 247 (quoting Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1355 (11th Cir. 
2018)). 
381. Id. (quoting Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1351); see also id. a  247 .6 (ack ledgi g ha  beca e 
the TCPA does not apply in federal court, the district court erred by awarding fees and sanctions 
a   i ).  
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i  fede al c  he e Kl cke  ca e a  di mi ed i h  reference to 
Rule 12(b)(6), a ic la l  he e he Fif h Ci c i  ha  g a led i h he 
e la  be ee  he TCPA a d he Fede al R le  i  he a .382 
S ill, he Fif h Ci c i  c f ed he a e  e e ed e  
safeguard the exercise of protected Fi  Ame dme  igh ,  b  f d 
ha  he a e ill c ea e   b a i e igh ; i  me el  ide  a 
ced al mecha i m f  i dica i g e i i g igh . 383 Concluding 
with the final step in resolving conflicts against the federal rules, the court 
add e ed he he  R le  12 a d 56 a e a alid e e ci e f C g e  
lemaki g a h i  de  he R le  E abli g Ac . 384 For the court, 
Rules 12 a d 56 a e alid beca e he  defi e he ced e  f  
determining whether a claim is alleged in a sufficient manner in a 
complaint and whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact 
fficie   a a  a ial,  a d he R le  l  e ai   he ce  f 
e f ci g li iga  igh  a d  he igh  hem el e , a d h  eall  
regulate proced e. 385 
The Fifth Circuit found no conflict between its prior rulings 
i e e i g a imila  L i ia a a e he  he c m a able c flic  
be ee  he Fede al R le  a d L i ia a la  i  le  b i . 386 
F he m e, he e i  li g  did  ha e he benefit of the Supreme 
C  c m elli g deci i  i  Shady Grove. 387 
Twenty-four of the thirty-one anti-SLAPP jurisdictions have included 
provisions calling for some form of expedited consideration of anti-
SLAPP motions.388 As outlined above, three circuits have determined that 
                                                     
382. Id. (first citing Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. 2016); and then citing Henry v. Lake 
Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009)).  
383. Id. (quoting Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring)). 
384. Id. at 247 48 (quoting All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2011)).  
385. Id. at 248 (quoting Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1357).  
386. Id. at 248 29 ( [A] -m a  b de  i  i g [m i   ike de  he L i ia a 
anti-SLAPP statute] is the same as that of a non-movant opposing summary judgment under Rule 56.  
(quoting Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2016))). 
387. Id.  
388. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752(A) (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-507(a)(2) (West 
2019); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-196a(e) (2020); D.C. 
CODE § 16-5502(c) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(4) (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
11.1(d) (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634F-2(1) (West 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
110/20(a) (West 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-9(a)(2) (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
5320(d), (f) (West Supp. 2019); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(C)(3) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807(d)(1) (West 2011); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528(1) (2016); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-21245 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.660(3)(f) (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-2-9.1(A) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1433(A) (C) (Supp. 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
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these expedited motions to dismiss provisions harmonize (or can be 
harmonized) with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and should apply 
in federal court. Four circuits have determined they are inapplicable in 
federal court. Because these state anti-SLAPP statutes are frequently used 
in federal courts, it has become critical that this conflict be resolved. 
5. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Recently, the Second Circuit decided La Liberte v. Reid389: an 
e l i e defama i  i  ha  im lica ed Calif ia  a i-SLAPP 
statute.390 Two years ago, Roslyn La Liberte was photographed at a city 
council meeting to discuss immigration in Simi Valley, California so that 
it appeared that she was angrily yelling at a Hispanic teenager.391 Joy Reid, 
MSNBC media personality, retweeted a photograph with a caption that 
alleged ha  La Libe e h ed ha  he ee age  a  a di  Me ica  
a d ha  he ed he ee age  defe e f immig a  a  he 
meeting.392 Later, Reid posted the same photograph twice on her 
Instagram page, with a caption alleging that La Liberte attended the 
mee i g i  he  MAGA ha  a d c eamed, Y  a e g i g  be he fi  
de ed  . . . di  Me ica ! 393 While Reid later publicly recanted 
once the teenager in question clarified that La Liberte never yelled at him, 
La Liberte sued Reid for defamation.394 
The district court dismissed the suit, under both Rule 12(b)(6) and 
Calif ia  a i-SLAPP statute.395 The court stated that La Liberte 
fail[ed]  e abli h a babili  ha  he lai iff ill e ail  a  
e i ed de  Calif ia  a e.396 
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the California statute was 
inapplicable. It recognized that the statute was a purely procedural 
mechanism that conflicted with the Federal Rules, despite its purpose to 
                                                     
§ 31.152(1) (West 2019); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.004(a), 27.007(b) (West 2020); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1404(1)(b) (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041(d) (West 2019). 
389. 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020). 
390. Id. at 83.  





396. Id. at 83 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (c)(1) (West 2020)). The district 
court also found that La Liberte was a limited purpose public figure, who did not plead actual malice 
nor show how the post was more than mere opinion. Id. 
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prevent chilling free speech.397 And despite this, the Second Circuit found 
that where a conflict existed between a state procedural mechanism and a 
federal rule and where the federal rule at issue was not invalid under the 
REA, the Federal Rules must be applied.398 Since the California 
anti-SLAPP statute erected a higher burden for a plaintiff than Rules 12 
and 56, it was inapplicable in federal court.399 
The Second Circuit first addressed the anti-SLAPP a e  e 
and content.400 It noted that the statute establishes a higher burden of proof 
f  a lai iff  a id di mi al  dec ea e he chilli g effec  f 
certain defamation suits.401 Uniquely, the California statute allowed a 
ecial m i   ike  a defama i  claim ela ed  a defe da  f ee 
eech ac i i  a d im e a e  fee   he l i g lai iff.402 
The Sec d Ci c i  f c ed  he a e  di i c  b de -shifting 
provision and looked to its own precedent for support.403 A defendant first 
makes a h e h ld h i g  ha  he ca e f ac i  c me  f m their 
exercise of free speech.404 And if the defendant succeeds, the plaintiff 
must then prove that they have a babili  f e aili g  he claim,  
i g leadi g   a  i g  i g affida i . 405 Finally, 
the court acknowledged other circuits and found that its own precedent on 
anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court was inapplicable to the case at 
hand.406 
                                                     
397. Id. at 86 87. 
398. Id. at 88. 
399. Id.  
400. Id. at 87. 
401. Id. a  85 ( i g Abba  . F eig  P l  G ., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Ci . 2015)).  
402. Id. (first quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (f) (West 2020); and then quoting 
Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1159 (2004)).  
403. Id. at 86.  
404. Id. (quoting Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 (Cal. 2002)).  
405. Id.  
406. Id. at 86 n.3 (first citing Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 2019); then citing 
Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018); then citing Abbas, 783 
F.3d at 1335; then citing Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014); then citing Liberty 
Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2013); then citing Godin v. Schencks, 
629 F.3d 79, 86 87 (1st Cir. 2010); and then citing United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed 
Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Second Circuit clarified why it 
aca ed  a c  de ial f he Calif ia  ecial m i -to-strike in Liberty Synergistics v. 
Microflo Limited, 718 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2013). La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 86 n.3. Unlike the case 
before the court, Liberty  l  e i  c ce ed a l i g Calif ia  m i   a fe   
another federal court. Id. (citing Liberty Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 143). In fact, the court later clarified 
in a subsequen  ca e ha  i  e e  add e ed he he  Calif ia  a i-SLAPP statute is applicable in 
fede al c .  Id. ( i g Libe  S e gi ic  . Mic fl  L d., 637 Fed. A  33, 34, 34 .1 (2d 
Cir. 2016)). The Second Circuit also distinguished another case a l i g Ne ada  a i-SLAPP 
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The court ceeded  de e mi e if he a e  m i   ike me  
Shady Grove  e ; did i  a e  he ame e i  a  a Fede al 
Rule?407 For the Second Circuit, the motion to strike passed (or failed, 
de e di g  he e ec i e) he e  beca e i  a e [ed] the same 
question as Federal Rules 12 a d 56. 408 Considering the heightened 
burden for a plaintiff to prove probability of success under the California 
statute, the Second Circuit noted that this plainly contradicted 
Rule 12(b)(6)  la ibil[i ]  a da d.409 And the statute contradicted 
Rule 56  c mma d  ide if [] a  ge i e di e f ma e ial fac ,  
b  bjec i g lai iff   h  ha  a ea able j  ld fi d i  
[ hei ] fa . 410 
Af e  i i g  he Ni h Ci c i  i c i e  i i   
anti-SLAPP motions in recent years,411 the Second Circuit dismissed 
policy a g me  ha  he m i  g al  ec  f ee eech c ld 
leme [] . . . he Fede al R le . 412 The court declared that the 
lic  j dgme  i  he Fede al R le  e e fficie  ec i .413 
Finally, the Second Circuit upheld Rules 12 and 56 under the REA and 
ef ed  a l  he a e  fee  i i .414 Like e e  challe ge  
he Fede al R le  ha  he S eme C  had faced e i l , he 
Second Circuit found that Rules 12 a d 56 eall  eg la e[] 
ced e. 415 Beca e he e le  affect[] only the process of enforcing 
li iga  igh  a d  he igh  hem el e ,  he Sec d Ci c i  held 
                                                     
statute Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014). La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 86 n.3. 
H e e , Ne ada  a e c ai ed  heigh e ed b de  f f f  a lai iff  cceed i h  
di c e , like Calif ia  atute. Adelson v. Harris, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467, 493, 493 n.21 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). Rather, it was a substantive statute without the same procedural mechanism that 
may interfere with the FRCP. La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 86 n.3 (quoting Adelson, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 493 
n.21). 
407. La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 88 (quoting Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333).  
408. Id. at 87. 
409. Id. (first quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); and then quoting 
Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1353).  
410. Id. (first quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); and then quoting Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1353).  
411. Id. at 87 n.4 (citing Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Watford, J., joined by Kozinski, C.J., Paez, J., and Bea, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc)).  
412. Id. at 88 (quoting Brief for the Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press & 21 Media Orgs. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee at 22, La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020) 
(No. 19-3574)).  
413. Id. (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 401 
(2010)).  
414. Id.  
415. Id. (first quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); and then quoting Abbas v. 
Foreign Pol  G ., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Ci . 2015)).  
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Rules 12 and 56 under the REA.416 A d i ce he a e  fee  i i  
was not separate from the anti-SLAPP motion to strike, the Second Circuit 
foreclosed them from Reid.417 
IV. SHOULD STATE ANTI-SLAPP LAWS APPLY IN FEDERAL 
COURT? 
A. Is Conflict Avoidance the Proper Approach Under Erie and its 
Progeny? 
At root, state anti-SLAPP statutes impermissibly conflict with valid 
federal rules created under the Rules Enabling Act. Therefore, under the 
Erie doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court, state anti-SLAPP 
statutes should not apply in federal diversity cases as a procedural matter. 
While the First Amendment rights that are protected by state anti-SLAPP 
statutes are both important and significant, equally so are the federalism 
interests embedded in the Erie doctrine.418 
As Suzanna Sherry has pointed out, the Erie problem is, fundamentally, 
a question regarding federalism and preemption.419 From Erie forward the 
Supreme Court has asserted that i  he ab e ce f a fede al di ec i e  
he c a  fede al c  m  al a  f ll  a e b a i e la . 420 
This conclusion rested on an assumption, made explicit in Hanna, that 
he j dicia  lacked e   ec  a ic la ed fede al i e e . 421 
Where Congress has expressly identified and codified the federal interest, 
either through statute or through the a al f fede al le , fede al 
c  h ld a l  he (c dified) fede al le. 422 
In determining whether state anti-SLAPP statutes should apply in 
federal court, we are faced with a situation where Congress, through the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has seemingly codified the federal 
                                                     
416. Id. (quoting Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018)).  
417. Id. at 88, 89. 
418. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13 14. 
419. Sherry, supra note 134, at 1161, 1185 87. 
420. Id. at 1186 87.  
421. Id. 
422. Id.; see also Allan Erbsen, Erie  F  F c : Ref a g Ch ce f La   Fede a  
Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 635 37 (2013); Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal 
Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 35 36 (2012); 
Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1413
14 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1792 95 (1997); Martin H. Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response 
to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959, 969 (1980). 
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interest in defining the mechanisms by which a case may be dismissed. If 
that is true, then the conflict between state anti-SLAPP statutes and 
Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seems apparent 
on its face. 
However, before examining that issue, it seems appropriate to examine 
several competing approaches that have been offered to address this 
apparent conflict. Two conflict avoidance approaches are offered in Shady 
Grove Justice Stevens  c c e ce and Justice Ginsburg  di e .423 
Both approaches require a highly subjective analysis on the part of a court. 
The approaches of both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg require a 
court to determine the subjective intent of the federal rule, the state law, 
or both. Such an approach would ultimately undermine the uniformity and 
consistency sought by the application of the Erie doctrine.424 
For Justice Stevens, under the guided REA analysis set forth in Hanna, 
the federal rule at issue could not displace a state law that is procedural 
e  i   i e i ed i h a a e igh   emed  ha  [ he a e la ] 
functions to define the scope of the state-c ea ed igh . 425 For Stevens, 
proper analysis by a court requires looking beyond the mere existence of 
the federal rule itself to the substantive and extrinsic policy reasons behind 
the state law.426 U de  S e e s approach, the role of the federal court is 
 de e mi e he he  he a e la  ac all  i  a  f a S a e  f ame k 
f b a i e igh   emedie . 427 If it is, then the federal rule is valid 
only where it does not intrude into those substantive rights.428 However, 
                                                     
423. See discussion supra section III.C. A number of academic commentators have written on the 
need for a unifying approach for assessing Erie conflicts. See Zoffer, supra note 72, at 530 31; Joseph 
P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1235, 1239 (1999); Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal 
R e : A  E a   Wha  W g h Rece  Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708 (2006); 
Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1067, 
1068 (2011); Roosevelt, supra note 422, at 2; Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie 
and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1135 36 (2011); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits of Erie 
Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 916 17 (2011); Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL Y 187, 190 93 (2013). 
424. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010) (quoting 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
425. Id. at 423; see also discussion supra section III.C.2. 
426. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 429 36 (outlining the legislative history and possible 
interpretations of the New York law). 
427. Id. at 419 (citations omitted). 
428. See id. at 424 25 (criticizing Justice Scalia for ig i g he balance that Congress struck 
be ee  if m le  f fede al ced e a d e ec  f  a S a e  c c i  f i   igh  
a d emedie  a d he e a a i -of-powers presumption, and federalism presumption, that counsel 
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the approach advocated by Stevens is simply inconsistent with prior 
decisions of the Court, notably Hanna and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 429 
holding that so long as a federal rule truly regulates procedure, the 
conflicting state law must give way to the federal rule.430 Additionally, 
S e e s approach would require an analysis by a federal judge of 
he he  he a e la  ac all  i  a  f a S a e  framework of 
b a i e igh   emedie ,  a  a al i  ha  ece a il  ld be 
highly subjective.431 Stevens recognized this dilemma, admitting that 
he e a e c  i l ed i  a em i g  di c e  he e a e f a 
a e ced al le. 432 As one ch la  e , [ ]he  a S a e ch e  
to use a traditionally procedural vehicle as a means of defining the scope 
f b a i e igh   emedie ,  he facial e a i  f he a e 
(procedural) purposefully differs from its intended effect (substantive), 
maki g i e  e eciall  ha d  e al a e. 433 For Stevens, a state 
procedural law could only be considered substantive in situations where 
li le d b  e i ed a   i  e.434 
While also articulating a conflict avoidance approach to address 
situations where a court was faced with a potential conflict between a 
federal rule and a state law, Justice Ginsburg followed a very different 
path than that followed by Justice Stevens. She agreed that the first 
question a court must address in this situation is whether the federal rule 
leaves no room for the operation of the state law.435 However, she inserted 
an initial threshold question into the analysis whether a conflict between 
he a e la  a d fede al le i  eall  ece a ? 436 In answering this 
que i , a c  h ld igila l  ead he Fede al R le   a id 
c flic  i h a e la . 437 The ima  blem ai ed b  Gi b g  
a ach i  e f bjec i i ,  like S e e  a ach. Ye  he e, 
the potential subjectivity is even greater, in ha  Gi b g  a ach 
                                                     
against judicially created le  di laci g a e b a i e la  (ci a i  mi ed)). 
429. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
430. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 427 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); see also Ides, supra note 134, at 1059 63 (a al i g J ice S e e  a em   
distinguish Sibbach); Ely, supra note 121, at 697. 
431.  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 420 32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
432. Id. at 432. 
433. Zoffer, supra note 72, at 530 31. 
434. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
435. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Traynor, supra note 178); see also discussion supra 
section III.C.3. 
436. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
437. Id. at 439. 
 
Harrison_Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:51 PM 
1310 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1253 
 
requires the court to carefully assess the substantive intent of both the 
federal rule and the state law to determine the appropriate scope of the 
interpretation of the rule.438 
The subjectivity necessarily present in conflict avoidance approaches 
undermines the uniformity that should be sought in applying the Erie 
doctrine and leads to the inequitable administration of justice, thus 
violating one of the twin aims of Erie. Additionally, contrary to the 
arguments put forth by Stevens, Ginsburg and others in support of a 
conflict avoidance methodology to address these thorny questions, 
conflict avoidance depends upon some evaluation of the presence of 
ambiguity in the application of federal rules and state laws, thereby 
making the approach more complicated to apply.439 
B. Applying a Traditional Guided Erie REA Approach to State Anti-
SLAPP Laws 
As seen in the cases discussed above, the question of whether a state 
                                                     
438. See id. at 442 52. 
439. In discussing the role of judges in interpreting statutes, Justice Kavanaugh provides helpful 
guidance in how this problem of ambiguity and subjectivity should be addressed by courts: 
But in most statutory cases, the issue is one of interpretation. To assist the interpretive process, 
judges over time have devised many semantic and substantive canons of construction what we 
might refer to collectively as the interpretive rules of the road. To make judges more neutral and 
impartial in statutory interpretation cases, we should carefully examine the interpretive rules of 
the road and try to settle as many of them in advance as we can. Doing so would make the rules 
more predictable in application. In other words, if we could achieve more agreement ahead of 
time on the rules of the road, there would be many fewer disputed calls in actual cases. That in 
turn would be enormously beneficial to the neutral and impartial rule of law, and to the ideal and 
reality of a principled, nonpartisan judiciary. 
With that objective in mind, I will advance one overarching argument in this Book Review. A 
number of canons of statutory interpretation depend on an initial evaluation of whether the 
statutory text is clear or ambiguous. But because it is so difficult to make those clarity versus 
ambiguity determinations in a coherent, evenhanded way, courts should reduce the number of 
canons of construction that depend on an initial finding of ambiguity. Instead, courts should seek 
the best reading of the statute by interpreting the words of the statute, taking account of the 
context of the whole statute, and applying the agreed-upon semantic canons. Once they have 
discerned the best reading of the text in that way, they can depart from that baseline if required 
to do so by any relevant substantive canons for example, the absurdity doctrine. 
To be clear, I fully appreciate that disputed calls will always arise in statutory interpretation. 
Figuring out the best reading of the statute is not always an easy task. I am not a modern-day 
Yogi Berra, who once purportedly said that there would be no more close calls if we just moved 
first base. 
But the current situation in statutory interpretation, as I see it, is more akin to a situation where 
umpires can, at least on some pitches, largely define their own strike zones. My solution is to 
define the strike zone in advance much more precisely so that each umpire is operating within 
the same guidelines. If we do that, we will need to worry less about who the umpire is when the 
next pitch is thrown. 
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2121 (2016) (citing 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 13 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)) (reviewing 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
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anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court turns almost exclusively on 
whether there is a direct collision between Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and state anti-SLAPP laws. In applying the Erie 
doctrine, as explained by the Court from Hanna through Shady Grove, 
determining whether a conflict exists requires an exploration of the 
procedural scope of the anti-SLAPP statute alongside the procedural 
scope of the federal rules, in this case, Rules 12 and 56. If this exploration 
leads to the conclusion that the anti-SLAPP statute answers the same 
procedural question as the federal rules and abridges the procedural 
operation of the federal rule, then a direct conflict exists between the 
two.440 
Here, while state anti-SLAPP statutes are designed to protect certain 
substantive free speech rights, their operation is almost wholly 
procedural.441 As discussed above, the primary procedural operations of 
state anti-SLAPP statutes include an expedited process for the dismissal 
of frivolous claims, the consideration of pleadings and affidavits in 
determining whether to grant the motion and dismiss the case, and a pause 
in discovery pending the resolution of the anti-SLAPP motion. 
In this case, Rules 12 and 56 provide a process whereby a court can 
determine whether a case has merit and should continue toward trial or be 
dismissed. Likewise, state anti-SLAPP statutes provide a means by which 
a court can dismiss a claim because it lacks merit, resulting in the case not 
proceeding toward trial. Both the federal rules and the anti-SLAPP statute 
answer the same question: whether a court should dismiss a claim 
pursuant to a pretrial motion. 
The real difference between these two mechanisms is the standard by 
which the court is to determine whether dismissal is required. Under 
Rules 12 and 56, where a party is able to show (1) that the claim asserted 
in their complaint is plausible on its face or (2) that the evidentiary record 
that has been developed offers a genuine dispute of material fact, then the 
claim of that party survives dismissal and may continue toward trial. In 
contrast, under state anti-SLAPP statutes, a party is required to show some 
e i  f likelih d f cce   he me i ,  a m ch highe  a da d 
than that required by the federal rules to survive dismissal and continue 
                                                     
440. See discussion supra Part III. 
441. Consistent with Shady Grove and canons of statutory construction, courts should generally 
not undertake an inquiry into the underlying purpose of the state law and, concomitantly, any 
substantive rights supposedly protected by a state law. In other words, in evaluating the scope of the 
anti-SLAPP statute a court should look only to its procedural functions in determining whether the 
scope of the anti-SLAPP statute is the same as the scope of a federal rule. 
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toward trial.442 According to then-Judge Kavanaugh in his opinion in 
Abbas, this difference matters: 
Under the Federal Rules, a plaintiff is generally entitled to trial if 
he or she meets the Rules 12 and 56 standards to overcome a 
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. But the D.C. 
Anti-SLAPP Act nullifies that entitlement in certain cases. Under 
the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, the plaintiff is not able to get to trial 
just by meeting those Rules 12 and 56 standards. The D.C. 
Anti-SLAPP Act, in other words, conflicts with the Federal Rules 
by setting up an additional hurdle a plaintiff must jump over to 
get to trial.443 
Based on this, it seems that no legitimate construction or interpretation of 
Rules 12 and 56 exists that will not create a direct conflict with state anti-
SLAPP laws. 
This conclusion is consistent with the decision in Shady Grove, where 
the Court concluded that a state statute that interfered with and conflicted 
with the mechanism for class actions under Rule 23 had to give way to the 
federal rule. This was true under Erie and its progeny, even though the 
result would be that the matter could be pursued as a class action in federal 
court, a prospect that could not have occurred in state court. As Justice 
Scalia wrote: 
We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-court 
door open to class actions that cannot proceed in state court will 
produce forum shopping. That is unacceptable when it comes as 
the consequence of judge-made rules created to fill supposed 
ga  i  i i e fede al la . F  he e ei he  he C nstitution, 
a treaty, nor a statute provides the rule of decision or authorizes a 
fede al c   l  e, a e la  m  g e  beca e he e 
ca  be  he  la .  B  di e ge ce f m a e la , i h he 
attendant consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable 
                                                     
442. One commentator has compared this conflict with that presented in Shady Grove: 
This clear procedural conflict is similar to the conflict in Shady Grove. There, Federal Rule 23 
was construed to be categorical: if a party met the prerequisites, then the party could maintain a 
class action. The state law in Shady Grove, the majority reasoned, kept claims meeting the 
Federal R le  e i eme  f m c mi g i  e i e ce a  all.  The a e la  i  Shad  G e 
that added a damages-related requirement for maintaining a class action thus had no room to 
operate alongside the federal rule, which had no damages-related requirement. Conversely, the 
state anti-SLAPP a e  make claim  mee i g he Fede al R le  e i eme  di a ea . A 
lai iff h  legi ima el  mee  he FRCP  a da d  i e a di i i e m i  ha   mee  
a different standard when challenged by the state law. Accordingly, state anti-SLAPP statutes 
that increase the pleading or evidentiary requirements for proceeding with a claim have no room 
to operate alongside the relevant federal rules. 
Smith, supra note 72, at 322. 
443. Abba  . F eig  P l  G ., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Ci . 2015) (ci i g D.C. CODE 
§ 16-5504 (2001)). 
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(indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system 
of federal procedure. Congress itself has created the possibility 
that the same case may follow a different course if filed in federal 
instead of state court. The short of the matter is that a Federal Rule 
governing procedure is valid whether or not it alters the outcome 
of the case in a way that induces forum shopping. To hold 
he i e ld be  di emb el ei he  he C i i  
g a  f e  e  fede al ced e   C g e  e e ci e 
of it.444 
Where a federal rule and a state law are in conflict, as in the case of 
state anti-SLAPP statutes, the federal rule applies if the rule is 
constitutional and complies with the REA.445 Under this analysis, the 
constitutional question is fairly straightforward, in that a Rule is 
c i i all  alid if i  eg la e  ma e  hich ca  ea abl  be 
cla ified a  ced al. 446 In the situation involving the conflict with 
state anti-SLAPP statutes, it is hard to conclude anything other than that 
Rules 12 and 56 are procedural, in that they govern the procedural 
processes to challenge the sufficiency of a claim and the standards by 
which a court assesses such a challenge. 
Regarding the REA analysis, a federal rule is valid under the statute so 
l g a  i  d e    ab idge, e la ge  m dif  a  b a i e 
igh . 447 Drawing from Sibbach, Justice Scalia presented this 
question accordingly: 
[T]he R le m  eall  eg la [e] ced e, the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive 
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard 
or infraction of them.  The test is not whether the rule affects a 
li iga  b a i e igh ; m  ced al le  d . What 
matters is what the rule i elf eg la e : If i  g e  l  he 
ma e  a d he mea  b  hich he li iga  igh  a e 
e f ced,  i  i  alid; if i  al e  he le  f deci i  b  hich 
[ he] c  ill adj dica e [ h e] igh ,  i  i  .448 
                                                     
444. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 415 16 (2010) 
(citations omitted). 
445. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (ci a i  mi ed) ( Whe  a i a i  i  c e ed 
by one of the Federal Rules . . . the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse 
to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment 
that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor 
constitutional e ic i . ). 
446. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987). 
447. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
448. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Sibbach 
 
Harrison_Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:51 PM 
1314 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1253 
 
Applying this test to Rules 12 and 56, it seems without question that these 
rules define and govern the procedural matters of whether a lawsuit meets 
the pleading or evidentiary standards required to survive a motion to 
dismiss or motion for summary judgment.449 
CONCLUSION 
In short, state anti-SLAPP statutes impermissibly conflict with the 
federal rules and applying the federal rules in their place does not violate 
the Rules Enabling Act.450 Therefore, under the Erie doctrine as developed 
by the Supreme Court, state anti-SLAPP statutes should not apply in 
federal diversity cases as a procedural matter. However, as a matter of 
normative policy, this may be an unfortunate result. 
While the First Amendment rights that are protected by state 
anti-SLAPP statutes are societally important and constitutionally 
significant, so are the federalism interests embedded in the Erie 
doctrine.451 The First Amendment protections afforded the target of a 
SLAPP suit do not ebb and flow based on the existence of a state 
anti-SLAPP statute, in that state anti-SLAPP statutes do not create or 
eliminate any substantive rights.452 All the existence of the anti-SLAPP 
offers to the individual or entity facing a SLAPP suit is greater procedural 
ease in invoking the substantive protections already afforded by the First 
Amendment. However, the Court has long recognized that federal 
procedural mechanisms embedded in the federal rules inevitably affect 
state substantive rights by their procedural operation.453 
                                                     
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), and then quoting Miss. Publ g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 
438, 446 (1946)). 
449. See discussion supra Part III. 
450. The Supreme Court has had two opportunities over the last two years to resolve the current 
circuit split described in this Article. However, the Court denied petitions for certiorari in both Los 
Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. AmeriCulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018), and Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America v. Center for Medical Progress, 890 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2018). 
451. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13 14. 
452. See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (noting that the anti-SLAPP a e me el  ide  a ced al mecha i m f  
vindicating existing igh ). 
453. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 74 (1965) (rejecting an argument that a federal rule 
m  cea e  f c i  he e e  i  al e  he m de f e f ci g  b a i e igh  (fi  citing Miss. 
P bl g C . . M h ee, 326 U.S. 438, 445 46 (1946); and then citing Iovino v. Waterson, 274 
F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1959))); see also Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 431 32 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and concurring the judgment) (explaining tha  he R le  E abli g Ac  i i  i   al a  a 
im le e  beca e alm  a  le f ced e ca  be aid  ha e b a i e effec  (ci i g 19 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4508 (2d. ed. 1996))). 
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Essentially, the federal rules involve textual interpretation.454 Absent 
Congressional action or some language in the text of the rule itself, state 
law cannot limit the federal rule. In performing this textual analysis, the 
scope of the state statute is to be read solely in terms of its procedural 
functions, while ignoring any substantive interpretation of the statute that 
might exist. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect important 
procedural rights of litigants that cannot be displaced by a conflicting 
state law.455 
It may be true that if federal courts conclude that state anti-SLAPP 
statutes are not applicable in federal court, person or entities seeking to 
exercise their First Amendment rights may be disadvantaged. Yet, the 
judicial branch is not the proper federal locus to secure First Amendment 
procedural protections. The legislative branch is the appropriate place for 
providing these procedural protections through the adoption of a federal 
anti-SLAPP statute. 
Several members of Congress have previously introduced and 
supported the passage of a federal anti-SLAPP bill.456 Similar to state 
anti-SLAPP statutes, the bill would allow the defendant in a SLAPP suit 
to first offer a prima facie showing that their challenged speech falls 
within coverage of the First Amendment. Once this showing is made, the 
burden would he  hif   he lai iff  h  ha  hei  claim i  likel  
to succeed  he me i . 457 If the plaintiff fails to meet their burden, the 
claim would be dismissed. Similar to state anti-SLAPP statutes, the 
federal proposal would suspend discovery, allowing it only where the 
court concluded that a limited amount was needed to address the issues 
raised in the motion to dismiss.458 The proposed federal bill also would 
allow interlocutory appeal of decisions on anti-SLAPP motions459 and 
                                                     
454. Orin Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111, 111 (2012). 
455. Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 2013).  
456. See, e.g., Securing Participation, Engagement, and Knowledge Freedom by Reducing 
Egregious Efforts Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015). The bill originally included bipartisan 
support, with three Republicans and two Democrats serving as the original cosponsors. By October 
1, 2016, thirty-two total representatives (twenty Democrats, twelve Republicans) had cosponsored the 
bill. See Cosponsors: H.R. 2304 114th Congress (2015-2016), LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/2304/cosponsors 
[https://perma.cc/6ZCP-WTLC]. Action on this legislation seems to have been stymied during the 
Trump administration. 
457. H.R. 2304 § 4202(a). Although this standard also heightens the standard found in Federal 
Rule 12, Congress has the authority to do so. 
458. Id. § 4203. 
459. Id. § 4204. 
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a a d a e  fee   cce f l defe da  i  SLAPP i .460 The 
proposed legislation would also alter the federal removal process to 
provide a mechanism under which a case could be removed from state 
court to federal court in situations where the speech at issue falls within 
the intended zone of protection of the statute.461 
While the result of such legislation, if adopted, would be to impose the 
anti-SLAPP procedural protections on the approximately fifteen states 
that currently have no anti-SLAPP statute, the benefits of a federal statute 
would be to provide uniform protections for First Amendment rights and 
address the significant federalism issues that are present in the current 
judicial piecemeal approach. The important competing interests identified 
in this Article require a legislative solution that would provide consistent 
procedural protections for individuals and entities when they exercise 
their First Amendment rights, regardless of whether that occurs in state or 
federal court. 
 
                                                     
460. Id. § 4207. 
461. Id. § 4206. 
